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ABSTRACT 
 Japan has a history of fluctuating security relations with its three neighboring countries 
People's Republic of China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation. 
The problems with these relations have manifested themselves in various forms. Firstly, in the 
case of China, Japan has for decades attempted to balance its diplomatic and economic relations, 
while at the same time dealing with the territorial dispute over the Senkaku islands it currently 
holds ownership of. Secondly, with North Korea, Japan is dealing with the difficulties caused by 
its war past and the DPRK's explicit ambitions for a larger nuclear role in the region. Thirdly, 
with Russia, who it also holds a past of war and territorial exchanges with, Japan has to deal with 
the Northern Territories dispute which involves four islands north off Hokkaido. This study 
examines the security policy aspect between Japan and these three countries from historical and 
political viewpoints. The research uses the case study method for the three countries. It relies on 
the use of existing literature, and descriptive means to create a comprehensive outlook on the 
connection between history and policy between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and 
Democratic Party (DPJ) eras between 1989 and 2012. After a descriptive historical review of the 
relations, through a framework of comparing 'security issues' and 'security policies' that were 
established during each political party's era of dominance, a comparative analysis between the 
parties' policies was established. This was done towards the goal of determining whether the two 
parties' policies in the case of security issues have had any major differences after the power shift 
towards the DPJ in 2009. The findings of the research indicated that the era under the LDP saw 
little intra-party fluctuation of policies, while the case has been very different during the DPJ's 
era. The research finds that the actual differences with major policies between the LDP and the 
DPJ have been overall slight until 2012. Rather, the DPJ's intra-party major policies towards 
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especially the U.S. security alliance and rising China have seen a 'political pendulum swing' 
phenomenon from one end of the range to the other during the terms of its three prime ministers 
Hatoyama, Kan and Noda.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Statement of Topic  
 This is a research on Japan's foreign security policy development in the post-Cold War 
era towards the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the 
Russian Federation.  
 These three countries have been the main security concerns for Japan after the Cold War, 
and in many ways have continued to be so until present day. Firstly, this study looks at the issues 
through the lens of the intertwined history between Japan and the aforementioned countries.  
Secondly, it proceeds to describe, analyze and compare the specific post-Cold War era major 
potential flashpoint events and policy directions between the times of Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) dominance until the current era of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). 
 In China's case, Japan has a long-lasting but controversial relationship in regards to the 
Senkaku Islands (In China called the Diaoyus) whose ownership was returned to Japan by the 
United States in 1972. Aside from Japan's war past controversies with China, the Senkaku issue 
has been one of the main causes for diplomatic difficulties between the two countries for decades. 
This research looks at the relationship between Japan and China with a focus on the Senkaku 
dispute. The research subsequently proceeds to show how the political climate between these two 
countries has fluctuated under the LDP and the DPJ especially when it comes to diplomatic 
difficulties such as the Senkaku issue. 
 In North Korea's case, the security focus has mainly been based on the threat of its 
nuclear ambitions. The history of the DPRK's unsuccessful negotiations with Japan and other 
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powers during events such as the Six-Party talks has repeatedly shown that the situation is yet 
volatile and should be a major part of Japan's security agenda in the region. The research 
addresses the difficult history of the Korean Peninsula and Japan from the early 20th century, 
and proceeds to look at what kind of effect it has to the relations in comparison to the current 
situation of intermittent negotiations.  
 Russia and Japan also share a long history which is marked heavily by a series of 
territorial disputes ranging from their early encounters in the 19th century to present day 
problems. Namely, the Northern Territories problem (Southern part of the Kuril Islands chain, 
north of Hokkaido) has continuously been a topic of relevance since the end of World War II, 
when Russia took the territories over. The research will explain the history of Russo-Japanese 
relations since the 19th century and their first territorial exchanges, and create a comprehensive 
view of the issues that have ever since the first exchanges created hindrances between the two 
countries. 
Significance of the Study 
 Japanese security policy has a wide history of literature today. The significance of this 
research presents itself in the form of bringing together several aspects of Japanese politics in a 
comprehensive way that has yet rarely been done before. The fact that the research brings 
together three major concerns for Japan's security not only from bilateral, but from multilateral 
perspectives as well, is especially of significance. This gives the reader a chance to look at the 
origins of Japan's current security problems as well as the course of their development towards 
the present day situation. In-depth literature on the effects of the DPJ's victory in 2009 is also yet 
quite limited, and the fact that this study brings together a comparison with the different eras of 
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the LDP towards the DPJ's victory is important as well. This contribution to the field of Japanese 
foreign policy on the historical front, and in the political comparison frontier is something that 
the field needs right now. 
Research objectives and scope 
 The objective of this study is to describe, examine and analyze the change in Japan's 
security policy by comparing the LDP and the DPJ policies. The study aims to contribute to the 
current understanding in the area of Japan's security policy with the three major security issues 
with China, the DPRK, and Russia. With the growing restlessness in the East China Sea 
(Senkaku Islands), North Korean continuing explicitness of its nuclear ambitions, and the 
Russian developments on the Kuril Islands chains, the aforementioned topics have a formidable 
history of published literature.  
 This research aims to create a binding balance between giving the reader a historical view 
on the territorial and security issues and explaining the Japanese policies and actions under its 
two main political parties. This approach is used to bring together what the author sees as the 
three most pressing security concerns Japan has surrounding it in the 21st century. The research 
also aims to provide readers both Japanese and foreigners interested in Japanese politics an up-
to-date view on the security related issues at hand. Namely, on how Japan's difficult relations and 
interactions with the three aforementioned countries were during the earlier encounters (circa 
19th century) and how they developed to the rather unpredictable state they are at in 2012 
especially due to territorial claims. 
 The study aims to look at the relation between old and present of Japan's relations with its 
three neighboring countries through the lens of security policy. The chronological focus for the 
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research is the post-Cold War era, but an additional historical perspective in terms of Japan's 
relations with the three main countries discussed is provided as well to give a more 
comprehensive view into the roots of the issues. 
Research Questions 
 The main point of interest in terms of the research questions is "How have Japanese 
relations with China, North Korea and Russia developed in the post-Cold War era in terms 
of Japanese security under the LDP and the DPJ?". In the case of all three, China, North 
Korea and Russia, the related research sub-questions are as follows: 
1. How does the early history of Japan's relations with its three neighboring countries relate 
to the current security environment and to the territorial disputes? 
2. How were Japan's pre-2009 LDP policies towards the issues with the country, and what 
were the main security related events that took place during pre-2009 LDP dominance? 
3. What were the main security related events during the post-2009 DPJ era, and how were 
they handled through policymaking? 
4. Has the DPJ been able to differentiate its approaches and policies in comparison to the 
LDP after its victory in 2009? 
Research questions 2 and 3 are descriptive and mainly addressed in the case studies in the body 
of the research. They are used to discuss the main research question and research question 4 for 
final analysis in Chapter V. 
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Methodology discussion 
 The study uses the case study method for the three main countries of interest, and it relies 
on review of the existing literature for empirical contents. Thus the research is descriptive and 
relies on empirical data and observation of the historical events and related policies. Aside from 
the focus on the historical aspect in the first half of each case study, a framework of comparison 
was established to differentiate between security issues and policies that were implemented 
during a certain prime minister's era. The case studies of Japan's relations with China, North 
Korea and Russia follow a systematic pattern of first looking at the issues and policies with each 
country through Japan's political actions. Thus, the pattern looks at the issues and policies of the 
LDP with each country, which is followed by a similar study through the issues and policies that 
were a part of the DPJ's era. A comparison between these two is then established for an analysis 
that concentrates on the prospect for changes that occurred or did not occur. 
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Chapter II: Sino-Japanese relations 
 
Map 1: Map of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
1
 
Chapter background 
 Despite increased economic integration between the People's Republic of China and 
Japan, the Sino-Japanese relations in the 21st century are yet hindered by disputes of historical, 
political and geographical importance today. A prominent dispute between China and Japan, 
which we can see combining all these three factors, is the Senkaku Islands (in China called the 
                                                 
1 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Map of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands," last modified September 12, 2012, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=ECS 
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Diaoyus, in Taiwan Diaoyutai) dispute that has prevailed ever since the United States relieved its 
control over the area back to Japan together with Okinawa in 1972.
2
  
 In this chapter the focus will be on what kind of events notable for international security 
did the Sino-Japanese relations face during the continuing post-Cold War rule of the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) and what kind of policies the LDP backed under different eras 
of its leadership. China's immense growth in the recent years both militarily and economically 
will also be an issue that is looked upon in relation to the LDP's policymaking. These 
developments combined have caused Japan to be increasingly on guard security-wise. This effect 
can be seen especially when it comes to (as of yet) the minor border conflicts Japan has had with 
China in the past years. These include events such as Chinese fishing boats continuously making 
their way to Japanese waters, sometimes with some diplomatic repercussions.
3
 The role of the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) as the current party in power is evaluated in comparison to the 
LDP after 2009. 
 
History, debate and importance of the Senkaku Islands  
 Historically speaking the issue of the Senkakus between China (then Qing Empire) and 
Japan (then Empire of Japan) can be dated back to the time when Japan placed an official marker 
                                                 
2 Yoichiro Sato, "Tango without trust and respect? Japan's awkward co-prosperity with China in the twenty-first 
century," in The Rise of China and International Security, ed. Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato, (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 96, 110. 
"U.S. return of Senkakus in '72 upset Beijing, Taipei", The Japan Times, September 16, 2012, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120916a4.html. 
3 Yoko Kubota, "Japan refuses China demand for apology in boat row", Reuters, September 25, 2010, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/09/25/uk-japan-china-idUKTRE68N09H20100925. 
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on them in 1895, signifying them belonging to Japan as a part of the Nansei Shoto island chain.
4
 
From these times Japan has carried on with the argument that before it took over the islands, 
their status fell into the so called category of 'terra nullius', which is Latin for "no-man's-land". 
This argument is followed with the logic that there was never any indication that they were under 
the control of the then Chinese dynasty in power. China disagrees with this, and has come forth 
with its own interpretation of the issue, arguing that the islands were not of terra nullius status at 
all during this time, referring to historical evidence.
5
  
 Some, such as Pan would point out the importance of the question whether the Senkakus 
were a part of the area known as Formosa (present day Taiwan) as being the key to 
understanding the arguments and justifications from both sides. This is closely connected to the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, which ended the First Sino-Japanese War fought between 1894-
1895. With this treaty Qing dynasty China yielded the Formosa islands, among other areas, to 
Japan.   
 At the end of World War II, the San Francisco Peace Treaty nullified the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki and effectively moved the administrative right of the Senkaku islands from Japan 
to the United States. With this Japan also lost its previously colonized areas. Subsequently, the 
islands were returned to Japan together with Okinawa in 1972 by the United States.
6
  
 The importance lies in the following: It can be argued that in the case that the Senkakus 
were to be considered originally a part of Taiwan, they would have to have been returned to 
                                                 
4 Scott Simon, "The Senkaku Islands: A Forgotten Flashpoint in the Western Pacific", Centre for International 
Policy Studies, accessed May 4, 2012,  http://cips.uottawa.ca/the-senkaku-islands-a-forgotten-flashpoint-in-the-
western-pacific/. 
5 Zhongqi Pan, "Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the 
Chinese Perspective," Journal of Chinese Political Science 12, no. 1 (2007): 77. 
6 Pan, "Sino-Japanese Dispute ," 73. 
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Taiwan just as other territories were taken from Japan as well in accordance with the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty. 
 The current official stance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan states: 
 
Since then [1895], the Senkaku Islands have continuously 
remained as an integral part of the Nansei Shoto Islands 
which are the territory of Japan. These islands were neither 
part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores Islands which 
were ceded to Japan from the Qing Dynasty of China in 
accordance with Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
which came into effect in May of 1895. 
7
 
 
 China does not agree with this claim, and argues that the islands were to be yielded as a 
kind of a package deal to their original owners together with any other areas Japan had to give 
away by the end of World War II (such as Taiwan and Korea), the San Francisco peace treaty 
and subsequent decolonization. The official statement on the ownership of the islands from the 
Chinese government was clarified in a 2012 white paper as follows: 
 
                                                 
7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, accessed 
November 28, 2011, from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/senkaku/senkaku.html. 
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Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands are an inseparable 
part of the Chinese territory. Diaoyu Dao is China's 
inherent territory in all historical, geographical and legal 
terms, and China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over 
Diaoyu Dao. Japan's occupation of Diaoyu Dao during the 
Sino-Japanese War in 1895 is illegal and invalid. After 
World War II, Diaoyu Dao was returned to China in 
accordance with such international legal documents as the 
Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. No 
matter what unilateral step Japan takes over Diaoyu Dao, 
it will not change the fact that Diaoyu Dao belongs to 
China.
8
 
 
Interpretation of history: Chinese arguments 
 In the post-World War II setting of East Asia, the said islands were under the U.S. 
occupation together with Okinawa and the rest of Japan. In 1972, as the U.S. returned Okinawa 
to Japan, the 'administrative right' of the Senkakus fell back to Japan as well. Both the Republic 
of China (Taiwan) and People's Republic of China claimed sovereignty over the islands through 
official announcements, and neither party has accepted the decision to transfer administrative 
right to Japan to date.
9
  From China's side, the arguments to the ownership are largely relying on 
historical reasoning. However, due to the lack of mutually acceptable physical proof it has been 
                                                 
8 China Information Office of the State Council, last modified September 25, 2012, 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2012-09/25/content_26628166.htm. 
9 Simon, "The Senkaku Islands." 
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easy for Japan to brush off these claims and simply continue with the official policy that there is 
no issue to begin with. Another possible way to solve the issue would be using the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) to give a ruling on the issue to reach closure. However, to date this option 
has not been used yet.  
 The Chinese historical arguments follow the logic that the islands were a part of China as 
early as during the Ming Dynasty (14th century) and Qing Dynasty (early 20th century), as well 
as in 18th century Japanese maps.
10
 China also counts itself to the victors of World War II, 
which would place them in the group of determining victors of the Potsdam Declaration. The 
Declaration stated that Japanese sovereignty would be limited to the current main islands of 
Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku, and the rest would be decided by the "victors" of the 
war.
11
 Now, whether the People's Republic of China should be counted as one of these powers is 
another separate argument to consider. From one perspective, as China was largely occupied by 
Japan, it was technically speaking merely liberated by the Allied powers. On the other hand, 
China's argument in this case is questionable from the point of view that it is well known that it 
originally never even considered the San Franscisco Treaty to be legally binding, as it also 
denounced the legality of the treaty in 1951.
12
 Price writes: 
 
 
                                                 
10 Pan, "Sino-Japanese Dispute ," 77. 
11 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the surrender of Japan (Harvard University Press, 
2005), 117. 
12 John Price, "A Just Peace? The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty in Historical Perspective", Japan Policy 
Research Institute, accessed November 26, 2011, http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp78.html. 
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On August 16, 1951, the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
published a statement by Zhou Enlai, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, regarding the proposed treaty and conference. The 
treaty, he stated, violated the United Nations Declaration 
of January 1, 1942, the Cairo Declaration, the Yalta 
Agreements, the Potsdam Declaration and Agreement, and 
the Basic Post-Surrender Policy of the Far Eastern 
Commission. 
 
From this statement it can be deducted that China had an antagonistic view on the Treaty of San 
Francisco. This is understandable, as China was completely excluded from it by the U.S., while 
Taiwan was allowed a separate treaty.   
Interpretation of history: Japanese arguments 
 Firstly, from the Japanese side the official statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
argue that the islands indeed were uninhabited and thus fell into the category of "no-man's land" 
in the past prior to 1895 when the Treaty of Shimonoseki took place. These arguments also 
heavily rely on legal grounds.
13
 Secondly, the official policy states that the islands are by no 
reasoning a part of the islands surrounding Taiwan or the Pescadores. This would mean that 
Japan did not renounce its right to them with the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951 as it did with 
its other formerly colonized areas. Thirdly, it sees that the islands were officially given back to 
Japan by the United States together with the return of Okinawa in 1972.  
                                                 
13 Seokwoo Lee, "Boundary & Territory Briefing: Territorial Disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning 
the Senkaku Islands," International Boundaries Research Unit  3, no. 7 (2002): 9. 
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 In 1992 China further pushed forward its official stance of having legal claim to the 
Senkakus, as it passed a new law called the Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 
which states in a rather straightforward manner that the islands belong to China.
14
 This has been 
the guideline China's official policy has followed ever since. Japan subsequently headed to give 
its own comment on the Chinese stance, persisting with its previous statement that the islands are 
Japanese territory. In its official reply statement the Ministry of Foreign Affairs says: 
 
There is no doubt that Senkaku Shoto are uniquely 
Japanese territory, [both] historically and from the point of 
view of international law, and our country actually controls 
these[islands] effectively. The present Chinese Act is very 
regrettable and [we] demand correction.
15
 
 
From this it can be seen that the inherent difficulty with dealing with the issue has been both 
parties' strong views on the legitimacy of their claim to the islands. 
Importance of the Islands: Territory, Economy and Power 
 What then makes the Senkakus so important to both parties? Their size itself only 
amounts to some seven square kilometers, and they are uninhabited aside from the occasional 
lighthouse construction works. However, the strategic and symbolic importance of the islands is 
very central when it comes to Sino-Japanese relations. From the Chinese side, Japanese 
                                                 
14 Hyun-soo Kim, "The 1992 Chinese Territorial Sea Law in the Light of the UN Convention", The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly  43, no. 4 (1994): 894. 
15 Pan, "Sino-Japanese Dispute ," 75. 
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"occupation" of the islands is yet arguably reminiscent of the former Japanese colonization of 
Chinese territories, and thus is seen as offensive altogether. The Chinese see the Senkakus as an 
area that Japan has not rightfully returned after its defeat in World War II. In Sino-Japanese 
relations this kind of an event that does not reach closure can keep the old wounds open, and 
make them ready to be used in populist political debate. This has been further explained by such 
as Strecker Downs and Saunders as creating an important opportunity for the Chinese to also fuel 
nationalist sentiments inside the country, which desperately needs to find unity today.
16
 From the 
Japanese side, for the right wing political entities and interest groups any issue that can deepen 
the nationalist sentiment in the domestic politics is a stepping stone not to be wasted. Thus, the 
Senkaku issue has been used for these purposes as well to increase nationalistic right-wing power 
inside Japan, sometimes through simple populist gimmicks such as when governor of Tokyo, 
Shintaro Ishihara, announced his plans to attempt buying the islands in 2012.
17
   
 The strategic importance of the islands is evident from their location -- they bring Japan 
closer to China and vice versa, and are located next to important sea lanes. The territorial 
importance of the islands is also connected to the economic factors. Some such as Simon have 
pointed out the criticism over the convenient timing when China started its claims to the islands 
in the 1970s, as this was right around the time the resource richness of the area was confirmed.
18
 
The claims to each party's exclusive economic zones (EEZ) are in the end overlapping, and the 
party that officially controls the islands will be in a highly advantageous position. This comes to 
especially commercial fishing opportunities, which are vast in the area.  
                                                 
16 Erica Strecker Downs and Philip C. Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu 
Islands", International Security (1998-1999): 114-115. 
17 Justin McCurry, "Tokyo's rightwing governor plans to buy disputed Senkaku Islands," The Guardian, April 19, 
2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/19/tokyo-governor-senkaku-islands-china. 
18 Simon, "The Senkaku Islands."  
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 Japan made its declaration of an EEZ according with the Senkaku Islands baseline in 
1996, and after this the clashes between Japanese right-wing and Chinese activists have 
increased dramatically. The Chinese (civilian) side has even gone as far as to start a national 
movement called China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands.
19
 The other side of the 
coin is the natural resource possibilities linked to the islands, as gas and oil deposits are expected 
to lie in the area around the islands and in the seabed surrounding it. Japan has been actively 
trying to utilize the self-claimed EEZ area by looking into the natural gas opportunities near the 
islands, but yet to no concrete avail. Understandably, with the current energy insecurities in the 
case of both countries, this kind of an opportunity is a driving force expected to fuel claims to the 
islands. Emmers writes:  
 
"For resource-poor Japan and now import-dependent 
China, the suspected oil and gas deposits in the contested 
area are critical to guarantee their respective energy 
security." 
20
 
 
 It is also important to consider the importance of the military power distribution in the 
region. Naval military activities from China's side have increased significantly in the recent 
years.
21
 This can be seen especially in the East China Sea from China's side, as it has other 
interests in the area such as the Spratly and Paracel Islands disputes with countries other than 
                                                 
19 J. Sean Curtin, "New Sino-Japanese strain over disputed islands," Asia Times Online, March 27, 2004, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FC27Dh01.html. 
20 Ralf Emmers, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia, (Routledge, 2010). 
21 Sato, "Tango without trust and respect?," 108. 
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Japan. China has been consistently testing its boundaries with Japan through sending its fishery 
and maritime patrol boats into the Senkaku area, but Japan's responses to these provocations 
have been mild at best as of yet.
22
 
 
Japan's China policy under the LDP in the 1990s 
 In the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, Japan's policy towards the People's 
Republic of China started to see some change from the previous relatively good relations 
spearheaded by Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in the 1970s. The advancements such as signing a 
normalization agreement in 1972 and the signing of a treaty of peace and friendship in 1978 had 
made things seem very hopeful during the Cold War.
23
 However, during the post-Cold War 
period Japan's economic power in the region saw a significant decline reversing the previous 
miraculous rise it had seen after the devastation of World War II. This decline manifested itself 
as the so called Lost Decade. China, on the other hand, saw an opposite trend when it came to its 
economic prowess becoming increasingly apparent to its neighbors in East Asia. 
  During the first half of the 1990s, it became increasingly noticeable that a switch away 
from PM Tanaka's policy of creating bilateral rapport between China and Japan by sacrificing the 
nationalistic notion was occurring. One of the key events to contribute to such a change was the 
elections of 1993, when the so called "1955 system" of LDP dominance buckled and was for a 
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brief time replaced with the first non-LDP administration since 1955, led by Morihiro Hosokawa 
of the Japan New Party (Nihon Shintou).
24
 Jun Tsunekawa writes:  
 
Ichiro Ozawa, currently the head of the Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ), split from the LDP and formed the Japan 
Renewal Party (Shinseito) that helped end the LDP's 
postwar monopoly on power.
25
  
 
Ozawa's views, although yet far more liberal than those of the later more nationalistic elements 
such as PMs Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso, of normalizing Japan by increasing its military power 
expectedly did not ease Japan's relations with China.
26
 Any sign of rise of Japanese nationalism 
is very much bound to have an adverse effect on its China relations, as China is opposed to any 
kind of expansion of Japan's military role in the region.
27
 On the other hand, China's 
unconditional attitude towards Japan increasing its security role was unsurprisingly met with 
nationalistic opposition in Japan.  
 The polarization of Chinese economical growth versus Japanese rising ambitions for a 
bigger role in the region's hard power politics started affecting the Japanese political realm in the 
form of the so called China Threat Theory. A school of thinking, which saw that Japanese 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
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26 As described by Michael Green in his book Japan's Reluctant Realism. 
27 Michael J. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 168. 
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cooperation with China in terms of trade or technology would only contribute to its rise to 
hegemony, was expanding.
28
 
The Senkakus and President Jiang Zemin's visit 
 The 1990s and the beginning of China's tremendous rise also saw a new phase in the 
process of response for the Senkaku islands dispute. With its economic and military growth, 
China became increasingly bold in its statements for its claim of the islands, clearly wanting to 
attract more attention to back their case. On the other hand, the growing nationalism on Japan's 
side partially also affected Japanese counter-responses to these claims.
29
 These two factors 
colliding can be seen as one of the first noticeable examples of Sino-Japanese relations 
deteriorating due to a territorial dispute issue in the 1990s -- something that would keep affecting 
the relations sporadically all the way to the present days of the 21st century. One of the pivotal 
moments of this political clash of nationalism and growing might of China was in 1996, when 
Ryutaro Hashimoto's administration brought the LDP back to power. With this shift the LDP 
hardliner conservatives did not leave it unclear to anyone that there was an ongoing clash going 
on between Japan and China regarding the Senkakus.
30
 Although PM Hashimoto himself did not 
have a notable reputation of carrying anti-Chinese sentiments, some such as Tsunekawa have 
suggested that the Japanese government was at the time controlled by anti-China factions. This 
was at least partially due to the decline of the previous "China school" of experts inside the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the end this made it very unlikely that any amelioration could be 
expected for the Sino-Japanese relations during their term.
31
 
 The 1990s also saw some cases of territorial violations from Chinese vessels that are 
often cited as "research vessels". Unless coinciding with other diplomatic issues most of the time 
these incidents did not gain heavy emphasis in the media. However, with an example from 1997 
when a Chinese research vessel intruded Japanese waters, it can be seen that China's claim to the 
area was indeed going strong: When warned by the Japanese maritime patrols the Chinese 
vessels promptly made their case that the waters were indeed Chinese, not Japanese.
32
 
 On the other hand from China's side it did not help the situation in the slightest when then 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Japan in 1998. The visit was expected by many to be a 
step in the direction of an era of stability in Sino-Japanese relations. However, the effect of the 
visit was quite the contrary. Although Jiang Zemin was known to have a strong stance towards 
the past grievances between Japan and China, namely during World War II, he took the Japanese 
by surprise when he decided to blatantly address the past issues and even demand a written 
apology from Japan's side in the presence of the Emperor.
33
 Jiang's visit can consequently also be 
seen as a good example of a sporadic case of giving the Japanese nationalist side more 
ammunition to use in its efforts for swaying the Japanese public to the conservative side. 
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The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 
 The Senkaku islands dispute heating up and Jiang Zemin's visit were not the only things 
in the political realm that affected Sino-Japanese relations in the 1990s. Perhaps the most notable 
one contributing to sudden increasing of suspicion from Japan's side towards China's military 
ambitions was the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis (also known as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis). 
With the primary notion that China was attempting to affect Taiwan's political orientation back 
towards a stronger One-China policy, the PRC started a series of missile tests around Taiwan in 
1995.
34
 Ross states that another aim for the coercion from China's part was hopes of affecting the 
upcoming 1996 presidential election in Taiwan. These tests happened between July 21, 1995 and 
March 23, 1996 which conveniently happened to be the day of the presidential election. 
Although the crisis was brought to a peaceful end with the United States' intervention with its 
naval force, it did set in motion some expected changes in the LDP's security policy agenda for 
Japan. 
 As Japan was right in the vicinity of the events of 1995-1996, it gave Japanese 
conservatives a tremendously good opportunity to use China as the bogeyman to get the Japanese 
people to vote for the conservative, anti-China candidates. In that sense, the Third Taiwan Strait 
Crisis perhaps gave a hefty contribution to the 1996 prospect of return for the LDP with 
Hashimoto. The collapse of the 1955 system was short-lived, and the LDP was back in power. 
With this shift the so called "China School" within the Japanese government, a group of China-
experts and people with skills to create rapport between Japan and China, started to disappear. 
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What followed instead was a policy of increased military cooperation with the U.S.
35
  
Tsunekawa writes:  
 
In April 1996, U.S. President Bill Clinton and Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto signed the "Japan-U.S. Joint 
Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century" and 
agreed that a continued U.S. military presence is essential 
for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific 
region.
36
 
 
 This was subsequently strengthened with the 1997 "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation". The content of the document spoke in a clear tone: The guidelines' were meant for  
Japan-U.S. cooperation in "situations in areas surrounding Japan".
37
 After the Third Taiwan 
Strait crisis it was a easy to see the underlying context of sending a clear message to China.  This 
can also be seen as one of the first steps of newly increased U.S.-Japan cooperation that would 
later on see its peak during the LDP's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's era from the early 
2000s.  
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Japan's China policy under the LDP in the 2000s 
 The notable increase in U.S.-Japan cooperation from the latter half of the 1990s saw 
further growth with the era of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi who took office in April 2001 
and stayed in office until 2006.
38
 Some such as Packard have even gone as far as to call the years 
2001-2006 "extraordinary" for U.S.-Japan relations after Koizumi's departure from office.
39
 
Indeed, right after taking office in 2001 Koizumi announced together with then U.S. President 
George W. Bush the document called "Partnership for Security and Prosperity"
40
, a statement 
that showed Japan the cornerstone of Koizumi's policy for his time as Prime Minister: 
strengthening the U.S.-Japan relations.  
 Aside from the praise for his achievements with the Japanese economy and structural 
reforms, PM Koizumi's era was also marked by the continuing trend of worsening of Sino-
Japanese relations.
41
 On one hand it can be seen that he continued the practice of his LDP 
predecessors of putting U.S.-Japan relations and the recovery of the Japanese economy as a 
priority over fixing the past mistakes made with Japan's China policy. On the other hand this 
significant hedging towards the Japan-U.S. relationship was also increasingly important for 
securing Japan's status in Asia. Especially with China's yet increasing presence the work done 
towards the U.S.-Japan alliance could be seen as an important asset instead of a hindrance for 
Japan's ability to deal with China. 
 In his January 2004 policy speech he stated the following: 
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Japan-China relations are one of the most important 
bilateral relationships, and we will develop a future-
oriented Japan-China relationship together with the new 
leadership inaugurated in 2003. The Japan-China 
economic relationship is getting closer through the 
expansion of trade and investment. In addition to 
advancing the relationship in a mutually profitable way, 
Japan and China will cooperate to resolve issues in the 
Asian region and worldwide.
42
 
 
 Judging by his policy speech one would have gotten a more hopeful image of his coming 
China approaches. However, putting aside the importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship the fact 
that he put emphasis on the increased importance of the economic sector of the bilateral ties was 
indeed made sense, as putting aside the territorial and nationalistic factors the trade between the 
two major economies was the one factor keeping things still at a balance. 
 Due to the neglect for the importance of Sino-Japanese relations it was easy for an 
individual or the general public to assume that Koizumi was a nationalistic type -- something that 
can be a crucial factor for gaining support from the electorate. The case, however, was not that 
simple when looked at more closely. Koizumi actually rarely made any direct statements that 
                                                 
42 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, General Policy Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 
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would link him into Japan's rightwing nationalist tradition personally: he instead preferred to 
speak through acts such as the Yasukuni visits. From one point of view this can be seen as an act 
of simply feeding the nationalist electorate. In other words it can be seen as being simply a 
populist and pragmatist approach: a means to an end, which arguably worked as he stayed in 
office for a longer period of time than any Japanese Prime Minister has after him to date.
43
 
 Be it either way (nationalism or pragmatism towards domestic popularity), PM Koizumi's 
visits to the Yasukuni shrine were seen as one of the most important reasons for the fluctuating 
level of amelioration between the Sino-Japanese ties during his terms in the office.
44
 The 
outcome of his actions was the same despite of the reason. 
Prime Minister Koizumi, the Yasukuni shrine and nationalism 
 Koizumi's perhaps most well-known gimmick through which he was able to gain the 
support of nationalistic Japanese was his continuing, well-covered visits to the controversial 
Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo from 2001 to 2006. Yasukuni has enshrined, aside ordinary fallen 
Japanese soldiers, also 14 class-A war criminals from World War II, including Hideki Tojo, 
Prime Minister of Japan during the war and a general in the Imperial Japanese Army.
45
  
 Although Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni likely did not directly affect the LDP's China 
policy, they certainly had a certain effect of Japan having to rely on reactive politics towards 
China. The visits without exception had a backlash effect towards Japan from the Chinese 
government's and general public's side. This was due to the fact that China was looking at them 
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with the assumption that it marks Japan's unwillingness to show true remorse over its past. This 
reoccurring backlash effect culminated to the point of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in 
China in 2005.
46
  
 According to Sutter, Sino-Japanese relations were at the lowest point since 1972 at this 
time.
47
 Chart 1 shows the trend for Japanese people's affinity towards China between 1978 and 
2006, further elaborating on the dire situation of Sino-Japanese relations from the general 
public's point of view. 
 
Chart 1: Japanese Affinity Towards China (1978-2006)
48
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 The same year, however, Koizumi seemed to have a will to take Japan's policy on China 
in a constructive direction as he reiterated the long-awaited apology from Japan's side to China 
over its past war crimes during Chinese president Hu Jintao's visit to Japan.
49
 Ironically only a 
few months later Koizumi made his notorious 2005 visit to Yasukuni, which presumably to the 
Chinese populace spoke an entirely different language than his previous statement of remorse 
from Japan's side.
50
 Overall, albeit remembered as being popular with his constituency Koizumi's 
era as Prime Minister was marked with great decrease with Japan's connection to the rest of its 
Asian neighbors, with the simultaneous gain that Japan's security alliance with the United States 
had grown significantly. Regarding the LDP's policy towards the alliance with the U.S., Koizumi 
stated clearly in 2004: 
 
Japan and the United States share fundamental values such 
as the respect for basic human rights, democracy, and 
promotion of the market economy. Japan’s relationship 
with the United States is the linchpin of its diplomacy. Our 
alliance is the cornerstone for peace and stability in the 
Asia-Pacific region. I intend to continue to cooperate with 
President Bush in striving for peace and prosperity of the 
worldby jointly tackling the issues that the international 
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community is faced with as we further strengthen the 
Japan-U.S. alliance in the global context.
51
 
 
Post-Koizumi: A turning  point for Sino-Japanese relations 
 After Koizumi, the LDP continued in power, but a sudden policy change towards China 
occurred when PM Shinzo Abe took office in September 2006. Unlike Koizumi, Abe was since 
the beginning known for his nationalist past, and in accordance to this his policies were expected 
to go for a similar direction with Koizumi's -- at least where China was involved.
52
 Wenran Jiang 
writes:  
 
Despite Abe’s relatively limited political experience, he 
was an active advocate of adding more “patrioticcontents” 
to Japan’s history textbooks and reducing critical views of 
Japan’s past aggressions against its neighbors. During his 
inaugural speech to the Japanese Diet, he called for 
revisions to Japan’s constitution and for a strengthening of 
Japan’s military.53 
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 As a surprise move, he decided to take Japan's China policy into a direction of 
amelioration instead.  The first step into this direction was his visit to China in 2006, where he 
made it official with the Chinese leaders that the aim of the new policy of his cabinet was to find 
common ground between the two countries and find a way to solve the past problems -- a first 
step into a positive new direction after Koizumi's era.
54
 However, the Yasukuni shrine visits 
were still an issue to be addressed. To China's delight, Abe decided to take a new stance with his 
policy on Yasukuni as well, and did not visit the shrine during his term at all -- something that 
further contributed to a renewed sense of amelioration with Sino-Japanese relations. This kind of 
an approach of putting diplomacy with China, Japan's biggest trading partner since 2004, as a 
priority over pleasing the nationalist constituency gave the recovering Japan-China relations new 
much needed energy.
55
  
 Another issue that saw some new careful hopefulness during Abe's term was the dispute 
over the Senkaku islands. After the beginning of the improvement of ties it seemed that both 
parties wanted to keep the status quo and attempted to side-step around the issue so that neither 
side would have to lose face by "giving up", although Japan's official policy on the issue was still 
unchanged and extremely straightforward. What helped towards a heightened level of 
communication, however, was the bilateral decision of installing a 24-hour telephone hotline 
between Tokyo and Beijing in 2007. Both parties were hopeful for this to help avoid an armed 
clash over the chance of the territorial issue heating up in the future.
56
 
 Abe's immediate follower, PM Yasuo Fukuda continued on a similar policy path from 
September 2007. Fukuda's policy towards China has since even been described as having been 
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"pro-China", which was welcome after the fluctuating level of relations during the 1990s 
leadership and more so during Koizumi's era in 2001-2006. Fukuda also continued the newly-
found tradition of not visiting the Yasukuni shrine, which Abe had previously established and 
proven to be a productive political play for Sino-Japanese rapport.
57
 Regarding the Senkaku issue, 
Przystup states that both parties agreed to work on the East China Sea issues towards a resolution 
"as early as possible" in 2007.
58
 On his visit to China in December 2007, dubbed as "spring-
herald", PM Fukuda and the Chinese leaders further affirmed their will for working towards 
"common strategic interests".
59
 
 The LDP's Taro Aso took office in September 2008, and  did not differentiate from his 
immediate predecessors with the newly-established policy of importance for keeping Sino-
Japanese relations thawing. On the economic side, in April 2009 he raised the possibility of free 
trade talks with China, a first time for a Japanese leader to suggest such a direction for the 
economy.
 60
 He also barely managed to side-step around the controversial Yasukuni issue by 
instead of visiting the shrine sending an offering to it, an act that still managed to stir the pot with 
China, but not to a degree that an actual visit to the shrine would have for example in the case of 
PM Koizumi. This was evident from the fact that his upcoming visit to China remained 
unaffected.
61
 Both Abe and Aso were seen as having a less vigorous attitude towards the 
betterment of Sino-Japanese relations. However, overall Aso's policies during his term managed 
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to keep the Sino-Japanese relations relatively calm and there were no major setbacks involved in 
that sector. However, his term was a prelude to a changing situation on the domestic political 
side in Japan, as the LDP was heading towards a loss in the elections of September 2009. 
 
The Rise of the DPJ and the role of its policy promises 
Hatoyama, Kan and Noda 
 A long-awaited chance in Japan's domestic politics occurred in September 2009 with the 
landslide victory of the DPJ. With Yukio Hatoyama as the president of the party at the time, the 
media was drumming for a lot of change on the domestic frontier. At the first glance, the new 
party's foreign policy seemed to very much follow those of the LDP, aside from its idealistic 
hopes of creating an "East Asian community" which would help with cooperation and nuclear 
non-proliferation.
62
 This framework planned to be similar to the European Union (EU) was to be 
a non-militaristic way of bringing Japan and its neighbors closer together. However, soon after 
becoming the Prime Minister Hatoyama's ideas about change on an international relations level 
became more apparent.  
 In his policy speech in October 2009, he firstly stated his opinion on calling for an equal 
security relationship between the United States and Japan.
63
 According to Rathus on the field of 
Sino-Japanese relations, however, overall few major policies seemed to have changed during his 
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term in comparison to the previous LDP ones.
64
 Aside from the security arena between Japan and 
China, one notable change, however, was the beginning of downplaying China's human rights 
issues since Hatoyama's rise to power (perhaps to appease the Chinese leaders, as Hatoyama was 
emphasizing the importance of ties with China), an issue that PMs Abe and Aso had previously 
kept on the table.
65
 What in the end got the most attention during his term, and still persists to be 
part of the "legacy" that PM Hatoyama left after him, was the confusion caused by his statements 
regarding the relocation of the American Air Station Futenma in Okinawa. His empty promises 
to the Okinawan people, such as his pledge to relocate the base within a certain deadline, proved 
to be a dire mistake eventually leading to his downfall.
66
 He stepped down from the PM's seat in 
June 2010, having failed to meet the expectations of the Japanese people. 
 The next Prime Minister to take office was Naoto Kan in June 2010. One of his first tasks 
was to respond to a Sino-Japanese incident that once again brought up the possibility of 
worsening relations. In September 2010 a Chinese trawler vessel operating in the vicinity of the 
Senkaku islands collided with a Japanese Coast Guard vessel, resulting in a diplomatic clash as 
the Japanese Coast Guard ended up detaining the skipper of the Chinese boat.
67
 The trawler, 
Minjinyu 5179, had been prompted to leave the waters by the Coast Guard vessel Yonakuni 
before the incident, but it had refused inspection from the Japanese, which led to another 
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collision with the patrol boat Mizuki as the Japanese were chasing the Minjinyu.
68
 Anderson 
mentions this "resulting in the freezing of all high talks, official visits, and cuts in exports of rare 
minerals by China to Japan," as well as incidents of Japanese nationalists threatening Chinese 
tourists in Japan.
69
 Succumbing to diplomatic pressures from China's side, the skipper was 
released, which showed a glimpse of weakness from Kan's part when it came to dealing with 
China.  
 PM Kan gave his first policy speech in October 2010. Taking a step away from 
Hatoyama's rather appeasing policy with China and possibly affected by the trawler incident, 
Kan openly dared to say his opinion about the military buildup of the China, calling it to return 
to being "a responsible member of the international community".
70
 This was referring to its 
increased activities especially on the naval sector.
71
 His words suggested a possible bold change 
towards returning to a more confrontationist policy similar to the LDP of the 1990s, especially 
when it came to the issue of the territorial dispute on the East China Sea. Foreign Minister Seiji 
Maehara continued along the same lines with a higher level of assertiveness, calling the actions 
of the skipper "malicious" and stating Tokyo's view that the collision was not an accident.
72
 
 With the territorial dispute now having strongly resurfaced, Kan faced a situation of 
finding compromise where compromise was virtually impossible to find, a situation that his 
recent predecessors were lucky enough not having to deal with. On one hand, the conservative 
side of his party was demanding a strong approach towards the dispute, and on the other keeping 
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up the ameliorating of relations in the making for years with China were at stake.
73
 Similarly 
with Hatoyama's demise, in the end Kan's most urgent problems eventually appeared in the 
domestic sector. With the Tohoku earthquake and following Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 
Plant disasters of 11 March 2011, all eyes were on him to deal with the situation efficiently. He 
resigned from the PM's seat in September 2011, largely due to inter- and intra-party pressures 
and accusations citing his incompetence in dealing with the disaster and its aftermath.
74
 
 His successor, Yoshihiko Noda had to step into boots that would not fit easily. The 
domestic sector was very volatile due to the ongoing aftermath of the twin disasters, and the 
territorial dispute was yet flaring and without a conclusion. Perhaps due to this fact his first 
policy speech in September 2011 had few statements that could have an enflaming effect towards 
Japan's neighbors. Instead he chose to use the upcoming 40th anniversary of the normalization of 
relations between Japan and China as a positive vantage point to start his term with, a move that 
seemed well planned considering the Sino-Japanese climate of the moment.
75
  In another policy 
speech made in January 2012, his approach was similar, aiming at a constructive, non-
inflammatory approach: no specific nods were made at a possible change with Japan's China 
policy in terms of the territorial dispute. However, possible future territorial violations from 
Chinese civilian boats were yet something Japan was on its guard for in light of the previous 
incident.
76
 In the June 2012 cabinet reshuffle PM Noda switched the Defense Minister to a 
civilian university professor Satoshi Morimoto. This move surprised many domestically and 
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internationally speaking. Especially for the Sino-Japanese relations this was seen as a possible 
point of significance (from China's side), as Morimoto was described by many as a conservative 
with lack of experience as a politician.
77
 
 In September 2012 Japan announced it having reached an agreement with the owner of 
the Senkaku islands on the issue of buying them.
78
 The movement for the nationalization of the 
islands originated from the idea of Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara, who managed to mobilize 
public support for the cause through heavy lobbying. As governor Ishihara had managed to start 
the movement, PM Noda perhaps saw following through with it as the only option due to the 
importance of looking at the importance of public opinion so that he could stay in office.  
 This agreement reached by Japan and the family previously owning he islands, leading to 
the nationalization of the islands, caused a series of anti-Japan demonstrations and riots in China, 
and the damages are estimated at over 100 million dollars.
79
 The riots further hindered the 
already shaky Sino-Japanese political relationship, but prime minister Noda's policy on the 
islands issue has been uncompromising towards China. China has answered to this with even 
more increased naval activities surrounding the islands. 
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Summary 
 In this chapter the focus has been on looking at the development of Sino-Japanese 
relations after the Cold War until 2012 by first looking at the historical background of a 
prominent territorial issue between the countries, the Senkaku islands dispute from both sides, 
and then moving onto looking at how Japan's policy towards the PRC has changed during the 
years towards the era of DPJ leadership. While most of the 1990s and 2000s were marked by the 
LDP's dominance in Japanese foreign and domestic politics, the 2009 DPJ victory has arguably 
brought some changes into the sphere of Sino-Japanese relations. One of the most notable ones is 
the ongoing effort of keeping the status quo of amelioration with the relations active, something 
that could only be achieved after the end of PM Koizumi's era in 2006. The three latest Prime 
Ministers Hatoyama, Kan and Noda have all had extreme domestic pressures to deal with 
including the relocation of the Futemna Air Station and the twin disasters of the 3/11 tsunami 
and following Fukushima nuclear catastrophe. In addition to this, maintaining the fragile 
relationship and balance of economic priorities and increasingly difficult politics with rising 
China has been a constant issue. This has led the latest DPJ policy towards China to be on the 
mild side, as right now it would be difficult for the Japanese government to deal with an 
increasing amount of diplomatic clashes with its foreign neighbors amidst its efforts of 
rebuilding the country after the twin disasters of 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 36 
 
Chapter III: Japan-North Korea relations 
 
Chapter background 
 Japan’s troubled relationship with its highly militant neighbor, Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK), has continuously been one of the important issues for the Japanese 
government to keep in check. The DPRK has a history of similarly controversial relations with 
Japan’s other neighbors and important allies such as South Korea and the United States. The fact 
that the Korean War armistice of 1953 still leaves the two counterparts of the Korean peninsula 
technically at war is one of the pivotal elements of this troubled relationship, and Japan has 
historically had an important part to play in assisting with the fluctuating level of rapport. Due to 
this, Japan’s approach towards North Korea in the past and today can be looked upon as a case 
study to analyze Japan’s foreign policy coordination and direction in general.  
 This chapter will be at looking at a variety of perspectives in relation to Japan’s North 
Korea policy and what level of cooperation Japan has managed to reach with other involved 
powers such as the U.S., China, and Russia. A historical perspective to the issues of the Korean 
peninsula will also be provided to understand the larger context of the region’s problematic 
status today. 
 This chapter will also look at what kind of notable international security events the Japan-
DPRK relations faced during different eras of post-Cold War rule of the Liberal Democratic 
Party of Japan (LDP). The main area of interest will be the nuclear ambitions of the DPRK, 
which continue to hinder its relations with Japan to date.  The role of the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) as the current party in power is evaluated in comparison to the LDP after 2009. 
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History of the Korean peninsula issue and Japan 
Time and again in the past, the Korean peninsula has been a playground for greater 
powers to show their might in battle over the region. As Korea was a weaker counterpart to the 
invading forces, it was largely seen as a victim in the past centuries instead of a force to be 
reckoned with. Looking at the situation from the contemporary perspective, powers such as the 
U.S., Russia, and China have all had contradicting interests when it comes to the international 
relations orientation of the Koreas.
80
 On the other hand, Japan’s history saw numerous invasions 
of Korea. Some of these invasions happened already in the 1500s which was yet way before the 
actual pivotal moment contributing to today’s historical grievances between the two. That 
moment was the annexation of 1910 which made all Koreans subjects of the Japanese empire 
and led to highly controversial treatment of the Koreans by the Japanese.
81
 The annexation of 
Korea was the point for Japan from where it was able to begin rising for the position of a 
possible imperial contender.
82
 The annexation itself happened without objections from the other 
imperial powers.
83
 This would imply that Japan was already getting a kind of blessing for an 
upgrade in its power level in the region. The peculiarity of westerna attitudes towards the status 
of Korea has to be noted as well. For example, according to Alexis Dudden, the French advisor 
Boissonade had in the time before the annexation evaluated Korea as being neither a vassal state 
nor independent in relation to China, but something in the middle.
84
 This further emphasizes the 
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way Korea was looked upon by the world at the time, and does not make it difficult to 
comprehend why Japan was allowed to simply overtake without objections. 
When it comes to the time of the Japanese presence in Korea, some have gone as far as to 
call the Japanese actions towards Koreans during the Korean occupation a “cultural genocide” 
due to the highly destructive influence the Japanese presence had on Korean cultural heritage.
85
 
In the light of this kind of historical facts, it is easier to understand the origin of North Korea’s 
original anti-Japanese indoctrination sentiment, which was essential in Kim Il-Sung’s 
empowerment of the national identity of its people. The demonizing of especially the Japanese as 
dangerous was towards rationalizing the fact that he wanted to create his own nuclear state 
amongst powers such as the U.S. and Russia who were holding most of the cards in the deck 
with their nuclear capabilities. Kim found his own way through enforcing his Juche ideology of 
isolation, separation, and military power on its people.
86
  
The aforementioned historical issues contribute to the original dilemma of Japan being 
involved in negotiations with North Korea, as the state has a clear history of hostility with Japan, 
and none of its historical grievance issues have been actually solved towards necessary closure. 
In addition to this, the fact that the North Korean leaders often subscribe to the personality cult-
like attitude of portraying themselves of liberators of the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, 
things become increasingly complicated. This was something that the South Korean military 
leaders could not argue, as they already had ties with the "enemy" (Japan and the U.S.) from the 
DPRK's point of view. 
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Power relations: North Korea and the Japanese perspective 
When it comes to Japan’s role in the past negotiations with North Korea (the “Six-party 
talks”, negotiations between the DPRK, South Korea, China, the U.S., Russia and Japan), the 
way the Japanese government makes decisions has been highly influenced by public opinion and 
the Japanese mass media. This is seen especially in the amount of importance the Japanese media 
keeps putting on the abduction issue (North Korea has admitted to abducting Japanese citizens in 
the past).
87
 Some, such as Hwang would argue that the whole issue of North Korea relations has 
practically been “hijacked” by the abduction issue and the media frenzy that follows around it.88  
There are other things to consider as well, however. For example, the issue of the 
fundamental differences with the Japanese and North Korean political systems and the 
importance of the general political science concept of socialization as something worthy of 
mentioning. The Japanese general public’s attitude may well be to a large extent affected by the 
highly socialized nature of the Japanese society. Socialization as a process is generally described 
as: “the process of inheriting norms, customs and ideologies” and “the means by which social 
and cultural continuity are attained.”89 The Japanese people are taught to think in a certain way, 
and so are the North Koreans; these two ways of thinking and especially on the political side 
differ very much from each other and are bound to clash. The fundamental difference of the 
totalitarian style and democratic style of living is something that already creates a gap of “us” 
and “them” for the Japanese, and it is hard to overcome these deep-rooted attitudes. This 
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contributes to the difficult issue of mounting pressures from the public opinion side when 
decisions are made by the Japanese government. 
Another point that has a firm hold on Japanese foreign policy is the influence of the 
United States. Japan is still to a great extent under the constant security umbrella of the U.S., and 
this keeps influencing Japanese decision making as well due to the security "debt" it owes to the 
U.S. However, some such as Sato would argue that Japan has actually differing priorities when it 
comes to solving the nuclear issue with North Korea, which in its own way may have affected 
the outcome and success rate of the negotiations.
90
 When it comes to different ways of dealing 
with North Korea, Japan has had some difficulty to see eye-to-eye with its other counterparts on 
the negotiation table as well. Japan still has separate (territorial and maritime) disputes with 
Russia (Northern Territories dispute), China (Senkaku Islands dispute) and South Korea 
(Takeshima Island dispute), and this hinders their relations since the get-go.  
On the other hand, there have been differentiating opinions about the use of hostility and 
friendship approaches with the DPRK. This kind of disagreeing with whether to use ”carrots” or 
“sticks” has signifiied Japan’s difference in opinion with its counterparts in the negotiation table. 
Japan would prefer to resort to the use of “sticks” (eg. cutting off aid) where as for example 
China would see more carrots (eg. pleasing the country through economic assistance).
91
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However, evidently in the past such "carrot" efforts have proven fruitless as North Korea 
has many times already kept dancing back and forth with its level of hostility (e.g. with South 
Korea) despite of different approaches that the negotiators tried during the talks.  
Power relations: North Korean perspective 
North Korea’s reasoning when it comes to negotiations with other powers has to a large 
extent puzzled scholars of the field, as it would seem to some that its actions have been very 
sporadic in the past (eg. switching from hostility to a search for détente, then back again to 
hostility). However, there is some logic and reason to be found in its actions even from an 
outsider’s point of view. The basic stance from North Korea’s side has been seen to be an 
original idea of it being surrounded by enemies. Furthermore, to look at the past is also important. 
The original great leader Kim Il-Sung’s hero legend managed to create the base for the anti-
Japanese sentiment previously mentioned in the history section of this paper. Decades later, it is 
easy to imagine that this kind of indoctrination imposed on its people can have only one kind of 
an effect, which is hostility towards a country such as Japan. 
 What, on the other hand, was Kim’s original agenda then? The role of the DPRK’s so 
called nuclear ambitions has been under debate, and the significance of reaching the nuclear 
capabilities that are mentioned in most North Korea related talks is yet undecided. However, it is 
possible to recognize the two main issues that surround the topic.  
 Firstly, Kim Il-Sung’s original agenda was to purely create a state with nuclear 
capabilities just for the sake of being powerful among countries like Russia and the U.S. He saw 
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that this was the only way to maintain the status quo decided by the Juche ideology, and to keep 
the country separated from the sphere of influence of other powerful states.
92
  
 Secondly, during the failed six-party talks Kim Il-Sung’s follower, Kim Jong-Il, changed 
this direction and started to rely on the hope of North Korea's denuclearization as a bargaining 
tool instead.  This seems like a more reasonable approach to begin with, but as the state of the 
negotiations deteriorated in the end, followed by North Korea’s abrupt declaration of quitting 
any such talks indefinitely, it would seem that the bargaining chip approach was not to be trusted 
after all.
93
  
This brings us to the current state of things, in which Kim Il-Sung’s original plan of 
creating a nuclear state just for the sake of having nuclear power might be alive after all. Another 
approach to look at the logic behind the nuclear ambitions is describing it as a “mode of 
survival”.94 Having weapons of mass destruction in one’s possession can be a powerful deterrent, 
and Kim has hinted in the past that if he got guarantees from other powers of continued support it 
would be able to dismantle its nuclear program.  
 In North Korea’s case, some comparisons to other more “normal” states can be made. In 
general, for a state to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens it needs to be able to 
provide economical support to them and keep peace. However, when looking at the DPRK the 
situation is obviously quite different. To sustain itself, North Korea has adopted more of an 
approach that relies entirely on ideological legitimacy (again related to following the Juche 
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ideals created by Kim Il-Sung) instead of an economical one.
95
 This, combined with an increased 
amount of indoctrination towards extreme nationalism, has somehow managed to keep the state 
intact, avoided revolts even during extreme famines and prevailed to successfully maintain the 
totalitarian status quo for over decades.
96
 According to Byman and Lind, the DPRK's coercive 
strategy for keeping its citizens and overall regime in check also include methods such as 
"restrictive social policies, manipulation of ideas and information, use of force, co-optation, 
manipulation of foreign governments, and institutional coup-proofing,"
97
 and this allows the 
regime to keep itself intact despite of its problems. 
Japan and cooperation with foreign powers 
 Sato states that the “North Korean crisis has without doubt accelerated Japan's enhanced 
military cooperation with the United States.”98 This would of course be the basis of Japan’s 
cooperation efforts with foreign powers; coordinating military security strategy with its most 
important ally in the region. Several emergency and otherwise special legislations have been 
implemented in the past for Japan to be able to cooperate with the U.S. more actively militarily. 
However, some leeway is said to exist purposefully in these legislations not to entrap Japan 
completely in any kind of future war efforts. As mentioned before what has hindered Japan’s role 
of coordinating things with other powers in the past has been their differentiating priorities when 
it comes to North Korea.  
Most countries, while agreeing on the importance of dismantling its nuclear program also 
have other interests. In Japan’s case this has continuously been the abduction issue. As discussed 
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in chapter II with the Sino-Japanese relations, the Senkaku islands have been a constant point of 
dispute between the states and have also in the past limited the amount of cooperation. In 
addition, China in general has more leverage over North Korea due to it actually still holding 
diplomatic relations with it unlike Japan.
99
 Russo-Japanese relations have their own problems 
when it comes to amount of international cooperation; past wars and Japan’s theatre missile 
defense plans with the U.S. have caused controversy and Russia has even hinted worrying about 
Japan’s own nuclear ambitions at the expense of North Korea.100 This kind of an allegation 
perhaps describes the true suspicious nature Russia and Japan have with each other even today 
after decades after the end of World War II. Russia’s growing activity in the disputed Kuril 
Islands, or as Japan would call them its “Northern Territories,” is undoubtedly also an issue that 
will in the future gain more attention if these parties are to ever return to a negotiation table to 
tackle the North Korean nuclear issue. This issue will be discussed further in chapter IV 
Continuity and the failure of the six-party talks 
 After the failure of the six-party talks in 2009 the relations between the other negotiation 
powers and North Korea have been unstable. North Korea seems to largely dance around the 
issue and try to act as a puppeteer with the “great powers” on the other end. However, there are 
some criticisms that have been raised with the original premise of the six-party plan. Hughes 
argued even before the actual fall of the talks that the multilateral approach had some fault in 
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it.
101
 Difficulties could be found in things as fundamental as translation between all the six 
different parties, but the main issue arose with the issue of leadership.
102
  
Whether these six parties were supposed to be equal “partners” in the negotiation table or 
whether for example the United States was an actual dominating force was never openly 
discussed. In his 1999 book “Japan's economic power and security: Japan and North Korea,” 
Christopher Hughes categorizes the different effects that regional organizations and multilateral 
efforts have had when it comes to the leadership issue.
103
  
The main issue he looks at ends up being the fact whether the United States was to begin 
with a dominating force (“hegemonic cooperation”) or if there was actual, genuine “concert type 
operation” to be found in the six-party talks. North Korea has repeatedly expressed its 
willingness to have bilateral talks with the U.S. instead of multilateral ones. This is perhaps 
because the DPRK sees the U.S. as the actual only power that matters for the case.
104
 With the 
bilateral possibility off the table, the question on why the U.S. did not to begin with agree to the 
bilateral talks must be asked. 
One must look at the past and recognize the fact that the U.S. did originally indeed form 
various bilateral relationships with other East Asian countries in the region, such as Japan and 
South Korea. However, the example of Japan showed the U.S. that such extremely favorable 
bilateral treatment as with the case of Japan can cause an adverse reaction as well; it may have 
contributed to the fact that Japan even today has failed to reconcile with its surrounding 
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neighbors regarding its war past.
105
 Victor Cha writes: “…by treating Japan as its “favorite son” 
in Asia, the United States unintentionally removed any pressure for Japan to seek atonement in 
the region.”106 
When it comes to past U.S-DPRK bilateral efforts, the DPRK did have its chance at 
bilateral talks in the past with the U.S. in 1993-1994, but the results from the talks were not 
notable in the long run.
107
 The bilateral talks also have the inherent quality of being difficult due 
to the fact that there are no third-party witnesses for the talks. Thus, North Korea was time and 
again able to contest the views of the U.S. later on regarding the nuclear issues discussed and 
what had actually been agreed upon. The U.S. was being patient with the bilateral DPRK issue at 
this point, likely due to the popular belief that the regime would collapse in not too long.
108
 
However, as this did not transpire in the end, the situation grew increasingly complicated as time 
passed. 
 Another reason for the improbability of another round of bilateral talks is the power 
relations between these countries. The fact that North Korea is “demanding” the U.S. to return to 
bilateral talks might alone be enough a reason for the U.S. to refuse the idea. In addition, in the 
international community’s context making the talks look multilateral may look better to the rest 
of the world. From a realist point of view, the U.S. also needs the combined leverage from other 
states such as China if it wants the DPRK to take the efforts seriously.  
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 In the end the DPRK’s sporadic belligerent actions themselves brought the end to the 
talks (eg. “Satellite” launch which was believed to be missile-related in April 2009).109 Perhaps 
for any chance of a return to the negotiation table multilaterally to exist the world will need 
action of goodwill from North Korea’s side as well for the next time.110 
 
Japan's North Korea policy under the LDP in the 1990s 
 Since the 1970s the rapport, although largely informal, between Japan and the DPRK was 
mainly established by the efforts of the members of the JSP (Japan Socialist Party). Prime 
Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s policy of two Koreas and their co-existence was a major policy point 
that showed Japan’s attitude towards the peninsula until the end of 1980s.111 By the end of the 
Cold War, a hope for normalization for the Japan-DPRK relations started to emerge. Japan’s role 
as a major financial power helped with the process, as the DPRK was highly interested in 
Japanese money, while on the other hand Japan wanted to increase its influence on the Koreas to 
balance it against its competitors China and Russia.
112
 
 In 1989 Japan was under LDP’s Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu. The Foreign Ministry 
released its policy statement that Japan was open to a variety of discussions with the North and 
did not maintain a hostile policy towards it, a statement later reaffirmed by former Prime 
Minister Noboru Takeshita, a move which would keep the customary secret meetings between 
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Japan and the DPRK alive.
113
 The JSP was still also a major player in these secret meetings, 
although LDP was the party in power and was calling the shots. This can be seen from the key 
influence Deputy Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru of the LDP had with the negotiations with the 
DPRK, which he spearheaded with LDP politicians in 1990 in Pyongyang, a policy action that 
has been speculated to have been a part of a “greater foreign policy autonomy from Seoul and 
Washington.”114 
Advancement of the normalization of Japan-North Korea relations  
 Between 1991-1992 Japan’s cooperative policies with North Korea, largely through the 
efforts of LDP’s Shin Kanemaru went further than originally expected. Notoriously, when it 
turned out that the North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung was prepared to go further with the 
normalization scheme, Kanemaru (who was later arrested on corruption charges) was managing 
the money and policies that Japanese firms were involved in.
115
  
 The normalization plan proceeded to its next stage when a surprising three-party 
declaration between Japan’s LDP, JSP and the North Korean Workers’ Party got together and 
came to an agreement of formally establishing diplomatic relations as soon as possible. As 
expected, North Korea also required that the agreement would include a formal apology from 
Japan’s side for the colonial past. 116 This rapid pace of normalization, however, was not looked 
upon lightly by Seoul and Washington.  
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The United States expressed its official concerns to Japan about North Korea’s possible 
use of the reparation money for nuclear weapons development, and South Korea on the other 
hand saw that the Japanese reparation funds, larger than expected, would lessen its influence on 
North Korea. This resulted in a slowing down of the normalization efforts and in a forced official 
apology to Seoul by Kanemaru, as Japan still valued it as an ally that should not be angered. 
117
 
These concerns resulted in a direct statement from Japan’s part on the policy of 
normalization with North Korea. The statement included four principles: 
 
1) Japan would conduct negotiations with a view toward 
enhancing the peace and stability of the entire Korean 
Peninsula;  
2) Japan-DPRK normalization would not occur at the 
expense of friendly relations between Japan and the ROK;  
3) While responding to property claims arising from 
Japan’s thirty-six-year colonial rule, Japan would not 
compensate North Korea for the postwar period;  
4) North Korea’s acceptance of IAEA inspections of 
nuclear facilities is important to Japan’s national 
security.
118
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The announcement of the principles was a success for Japan, and put it back on its 
normal track with Seoul and Washington after the initial shock caused by the non-consultation 
with them.
119
 The normalization talks subsequently continued with North Korea. However, the 
interception by the United States and South Korea had already laid a seed of schism for the 
previously promising normalization talks from North Korea’s side.  
As the normalization talks continued for as many as eight times during 1991-1992, the 
DPRK continued to demand that Japan stay with the framework established with the previous 
three-party declaration.
120
 In addition, due to the U.S.’ pressure for inspections of the IAEA, 
Japan had also requested such cooperation from North Korea – something that the DPRK is 
notoriously wary of even today. With these factors combined the talks did not get to see much 
development in the end.
121
 When the key mediator and negotiator between North Korea and 
Japan, Kanemaru, was finally arrested on corruption charges in 1992 the situation with the 
normalization saw further deterioration.
122
 
However, the problem that finalized the eventual doom of the negotiations was Japan’s 
continued requests for North Korea to grant visitation rights to Japan for the Japanese wives of 
North Korean men, who had previously moved to North Korea with their repatriating husbands 
during 1959-1963.
123
 In addition to this, the other issue of growing interest in the kidnappings of 
Japanese citizens to North Korea caused Japan to inquire the DPRK especially about the fate of 
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Yaeko Taguchi, one of the many women who were taken by North Korea to train its spies in 
languages and Japanese culture in the previous decades.
124
 North Korea saw this kind of 
continued inquiries as a violation of its strict self-determination policy (no country should be let 
meddle with its internal affairs) and instead turned its prospects towards the United States for 
future negotiation power. 
Collapse of the normalization talks and the 1994 nuclear crisis 
By 1993 the United States had strengthened its stance on getting the DPRK to accept its 
demands for official IAEA inspections, and stated its willingness to resort to even “coercive 
measures” in seeking compliance from North Korea’s side.125 Not long after this the DPRK 
surprised its neighbors by firing a Nodong missile into the Sea of Japan, while citing its policy of 
not accepting any kind of sanctions from the United States or Japan – such actions would be 
considered acts of war. The then Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa of the LDP 
attempted to hide the North Korean missile test’s existence from the public in hopes of stopping 
further worsening of the situation, but failed to do so in the end.
126
 
The situation continuing to escalate when the United States started preparing for serious 
contingencies in terms of further DPRK hostilities, and as an ally Japan had to be a part of them. 
However, the nuclear crisis clearly showed Japan’s level of unpreparedness when it came to 
cooperating with the United States during an emergency such as this, as Japan’s legislations 
proved partially insufficient. Fouse writes:  
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The Japanese government was wholly unprepared for these 
developments, having no contingency legislation for 
support of U.S. forces outside of a direct attack on Japan 
itself. A study group established within the chief cabinet 
secretary’s office considered the U.S. requests and found 
that while Article 6 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 
provided grounds for allowing use of the bases in Japan, 
the more active types of support requested by the United 
States would violate Japan’s ban on collective self-
defense.
127
 
 
The situation caused the relations between the DPRK, Japan and the United States to be 
on edge until the former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s visit to North Korea in 1994, which led 
to the planning of the Agreed Framework, the first step in an effort to get a give-and-take type of 
a relationship going with Pyongyang. The United States with its allies would give the DPRK 
crude oil and light water reactors, and North Korea would agree to stop its nuclear program 
altogether.
128
 This plan proved to be too ambitious in the end, as its actual realization was 
constantly hindered by especially the U.S. congress’s initial reluctance to give the financial 
backing necessary for the projects to be launched.
129
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Aftermath of the 1994 crisis and policy changes 
Understandably the aftermath of the crisis had shown Japan in a clear manner that it 
would in the future have to ensure having clearer contingency policies for cooperation with the 
United States in such situations to ensure that the latter would not have to rethink the structure of 
its alliance with Japan. The situation had caused some direct changes in the cooperation policy.  
By 1995 under Prime Minister Tomi’ichi Murayama of the Japan Socialist Party, Japan’s 
National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) went under revision.
130
 The revision strengthened 
and made Japan’s role clearer were there to be a situation around its territory that affected its 
peace and security. The revision included a statement highlighting the importance of “the smooth 
and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements”131, but omitted any direct 
examples of such situations. 
Subsequently, the 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security stressed the continuing 
importance of their bilateral security arrangement. In the Declaration it was stated that the 
relationship would “remain the cornerstone for a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-
Pacific region.”132A further development between Japan and the United States was the signing of 
the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which newly gave Japan more freedom 
to participate in an increased supporting role with U.S.-Japan military exercises and United 
Nations’ peace-keeping operations (PKOs). However, the assistance capabilities were limited to 
non-lethal activities such as food, transportation and maintenance.
133
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In terms of direct Japan-North Korea relations, Japan had already joined the signing of 
the Agreed Framework in 1994, although there were continued conflicting views from the LDP 
hardliners. Next, in 1995 Japan gave its financial backing to the short-lived Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The organization’s main objective was to see to the 
construction of the promised light water reactors (LWR). LWRs are seen as a safer alternative 
when it comes to production of plutonium that could be used for making weapons of mass 
destruction, as it is less efficient at it.
134
 Japan’s share of the expenses of the construction effort 
reached as high as 20% in the end, which meant granting around 800 million dollars for KEDO 
to use.
135
  
Re-initiating normalization, collapse and one more re-initiation 
In 1995 Japan again re-initiated its efforts for normalization under Prime Minister 
Murayama, resulting in visits to Pyongyang by the government coalition of the LDP, Sakigake 
and Socialist Parties. An agreement on food aid to the DPRK was reached in the coming months, 
and in September 1995 PM Murayama gave an official statement about the effort to normalize 
relations with the DPRK. Continued pressures and opposition from South Korea’s side prevented 
any concrete developments with the talks during PM Murayama’s period.136  
Further development to the situation for Japan’s disappointment followed after PM 
Ryutaro Hashimoto of the LDP took office at the beginning of 1996. The United States was 
planning a four-party initiative by joining itself in the effort with South Korea, China and the 
DPRK, as the dialogue between the Koreas had not made any noticeable advances since the 
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drafting of the Agreed Framework. As Japan was at this point left out of the talks, the 20% paid 
for KEDO’s reactor projects started to seem to have been funds wasted – no further influence 
was gained.
137
 Not to be left out instead Japan decided to attempt a re-initiation of a bilateral 
effort between itself and the DPRK.  Of course, on the behalf of the members of the four-party 
talks this seemed like a move that would only further complicate the situation.  
Japan kept its decisive stand on wanting to keep its bilateral effort going under PM 
Hashimoto, and proceeded to reopen the case of the ‘Japanese wives issue’ in North Korea in 
1997, which was seen as the least problematic.
138
 Japan's stance was perhaps too ambitious since 
the beginning, as it wanted the DPRK to let all of the wives to return to Japan. Very little 
progress followed in comparison to what Japan had hoped for. North Korea sent only smaller 
groups of Japanese citizens to visit Japan in 1997 and 1998.  
When it came to the more serious issue of the abducted citizens, what followed was 
further denial on the DPRK’s part of any more Japanese missing citizens residing in the 
country.
139
 The situation kept the relations cold and the normalization prospect was once again 
facing a stalemate with the then Vice Foreign Minister Shunji Yanai’s statement that there would 
be little chance for solving the normalization problem and that no official talks could follow 
before the issue with the kidnapped Japanese would be solved.
140
 
As Japan’s stance on the kidnappings issue seemed unmovable, the DPRK decided to 
turn around on its previously somewhat promising attitude with a possibility for normalization. 
In 1998 it went forward with the test launch of a Taepodong rocket, which traveled over Japan’s 
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northern part before falling into the Pacific.
141
 What followed was deep condemnation from 
Japan’s part, and further escalation of the situation away from any possible compromise that 
could lead to re-initiation of the normalization talks. The DPRK’s image in Japan was again 
extremely low, and Japan decided to put pressure on it by stopping its previous food aid and 
expensive financial input to the KEDO cause.
142
 This can be seen as effectively leading to its 
withdrawal from further normalization talks. 
The difficulty of maintaining the pact to keep KEDO alive became apparent with Japan’s 
reluctance to continue supporting it financially. The previously trilateral agenda between the 
United States, South Korea and Japan faced a crisis. Understandably Japan, as the one country to 
have recently been concretely affected by the DPRK’s threatening rocket politics, was expecting 
a harder line from its two cooperative states.
143
 Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi of the LDP held a 
speech at the UN and was vocal about his demands for an increased effort of nuclear non-
proliferation from the five nuclear states of the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and the 
United States, while criticizing North Korea for the previous test launch.
144
 
With the mounting pressure from the United States and South Korea, and due to the lack 
of any feasible alternatives, Japan re-joined the trilateral effort and started increasing its military 
cooperation with the two again. It was followed by two advances. Firstly, a Joint Declaration on 
security cooperation with South Korea was announced.
145
 Secondly, due to the general 
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atmosphere of uncertainty caused by the looming threat of North Korea, revision of the U.S.-
Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines was implemented as well. 
Militarily speaking the possible threat from the DPRK’s side caused some direct changes 
in attitude from the Japanese government’s side. Japan was eager to have more control with its 
security, especially over its territorial waters. Japan saw that the United States was not taking the 
issue with North Korea seriously enough. During Prime Minister Obuchi’s term some concrete 
examples of Japan’s new, more proactive style of engaging with the DPRK threat emerged.146 
Firstly, his cabinet authorized the Marine Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to fire upon any North 
Korean spy vessels that would come to Japanese waters after an incident occurred with such 
vessels.
147
 Secondly, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) was equipped with airborne refueling 
planes, which theoretically gave it a capability to even attack North Korean bases.
148
 
 In 1999 Japan made the decision to participate in another bilateral effort for 
normalization followed by President Clinton’s example, and the fear of being left out on 
negotiating on issues that are of most interest to it, namely the missile issue.
149
 Former Prime 
Minister Murayama’s delegation was the one to re-initiate the talks. The task was not easy; 
public opinion on North Korea was yet extremely negative in Japan, and nationalistic activism 
demanding harsh measures was on the rise.
150
 In the 2000s the situation with the DPRK would 
continue to fluctuate and face further complications. 
 
                                                 
146 Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, A History of the Liberal Democratic Party: Chapter Eighteen Period of 
President Obuchi's Leadership, accessed September 10, 2012, from Liberal Democratic Party of Japan: 
http://www.jimin.jp/english/about_ldp/history/104302.html. 
147 Fouse, "Japan's Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging towards autonomy?," 145. 
148 Hajime Izumi, "Pyongyang grasps new realities," Japan Quarterly (2000). 
149 Fouse, "Japan's Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging towards autonomy?," 145. 
150 Fouse, "Japan's Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging towards autonomy?," 146. 
 58 
 
Japan's North Korea policy under the LDP in the 2000s 
 Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori of the LDP took office in April 2000 and the ninth round of 
bilateral negotiations between Japan the DPRK started headed by ambassador Kojiro Takano in 
Beijing. While the ninth round’s results (or the lack of them) were highly unsurprising, both 
parties agreed that the talks should continue and the issues of interest remained very much the 
same; Japan was eager to know about its kidnapped citizens and the status of the North Korean 
missile program. Fouse writes: “North Korea demanded a written, legally binding apology 
backed by reparations, including damages for stolen cultural artifacts and an assurance of the 
legal status of pro-Pyongyang Koreans living in Japan.”151 
 With President Bush taking office in 2001, the United States proceeded to change its 
policy on North Korea to a harsher direction. This led the DPRK to look back to the direction of 
Japan for a summit meeting.
152
 However, Prime Minister Mori was unable to get support for 
such an effort, and during the rest of his term much movement towards positive normalization 
diplomacy was not reached.  
The Koizumi era developments with the DPRK 
 In April 2001 the highly popular Junichiro Koizumi took office as prime minister, and 
was able to move the DPRK effort forward once again. By autumn 2001 the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan had started a campaign of Japan-North Korea meetings that were held secret 
from the public.
153
 As previously expected, in 2002 President Bush’s harsher policies and the 
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ultimate decision to include North Korea to his infamous “axis of evil” gave the DPRK more 
reason to maintain its informal relationship with Japan. Japan managed to get concrete results 
from its bilateral talks in the form of getting a detained journalist returned safely and a promise 
from the North Korean Red Cross to continue its search for the Japanese citizens previously 
kidnapped, an issue that had been one of the main hindrances between the countries during all of 
the previous negotiations.
154
 
 September 2002 saw the opening of the first Japan-DPRK summit meeting.
155
 The 
meeting resulted in the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, which was a hopeful promise 
of continued cooperation and adherence to international law from both sides.
156
 PM Koizumi was 
facing mixed feelings from the public during this time. Some political commentators saw his 
attempts to increase the publicity of the North Korea issue as a tactic to get the public’s eye away 
from the fact that his economic reforms were not proceeding as promised.
157
 This wave of 
criticism was short-lived, as Koizumi’s efforts bore some fruits in the form of a confession from 
the DPRK’s side: they had indeed been kidnapping Japanese citizens in the past.158 This, of 
course did not come as a surprise to anyone, but was seen as a breakthrough in getting the DPRK 
to open up on the issue. Although a kind of an achievement from a diplomacy point-of-view, the 
observable consequence of North Korea admitting to the acts it had been accused of for decades, 
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was that the public opinion on it plummeted and the next round of official normalization talks 
failed to see any results.
159
  
 Only a month later the situation with North Korea faced another crisis, as the previously 
hopeful Agreed Framework initiative faced utter failure as a consequence to the U.S. confronting 
the DPRK with evidence of its hidden uranium enrichment program.
160
 Ultimately this led to the 
DPRK’s departure from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and mass deporting of 
international personnel in charge of monitoring the situation in North Korea.  
 The next year with the initiative of the United States and China the so-called Six-Party 
talks initiative was launched in August 2003 in Beijing. Although originally the DPRK had 
strongly demanded strictly bilateral talks with the United States, it agreed to join the multilateral 
platform. The final group of attendees were the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, Russia 
and North Korea. The talks proceeded to their fifth round during Koizumi’s era as prime minister 
until 2006.
161
 Japan’s position as one-sixth of the negotiator group was a complicated one, as its 
priorities on what it wanted to achieve from the negotiations differed from the main powers 
leading the discussions, such as the United States; Japan wanted more answers about the 
abduction issue while the United States concentrated on the long-term issue of dismantling the 
nuclear program. Also the style of negotiation and the dichotomy of use of the “carrots” and 
“sticks” approaches pulled Japan to a different direction.162 
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Post-Koizumi: Abe, Fukuda and Aso 
September 2006 saw the inauguration of LDP’s Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister. Abe had 
already shown his preference for style of diplomacy with the DPRK in July 2006, as he strongly 
advocated mandatory sanctions towards the DPRK after its newest provocative missile test 
rounds.  The advocacy was followed by more action. Green and Szechenyi write: 
 
Most intriguing was the strong message Abe sent the 
international community when his government imposed 
unilateral sanctions against North Korea and then led 
other members of the United Nations Security Council to 
support resolution 1718, which invoked Chapter 7 of the 
UN charter calling for mandatory sanctions against 
countries that threaten international security.
163
 
 
A year later after Abe’s inauguration he made way for LDP’s Yasuo Fukuda as prime 
minister. Fukuda’s approach to North Korea was quite different from that of Abe’s. While Abe 
had openly been an advocate of the “sticks” approach of reprimanding the DPRK into order, 
Fukuda believed in a more dialogue-driven alternative, which was welcomed by the DPRK after 
Abe’s hard-line approach.164  
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 Fukuda’s successor, PM Taro Aso of the LDP, took office in September 2008. PM Aso 
continued the set course of the Six-Party talks which were making little progress at the time. 
Despite international pressure the DPRK continued with another test launch in April 2009. The 
launch was announced to be that of a satellite by North Korea, and ended in a failure much like 
the previous ones had.
165
 However, as the DPRK had refused to put the test launch to a halt, the 
demand for sanctions within the member countries of the talks, such as South Korea and Japan, 
started to mount once again, culminating in United Nations Security Council unanimous 
condemnation. This resulted in the end of the Six-Party talks for an undefined period of time 
from North Korea’s side.166 
 
The Rise of the DPJ and North Korea relations 
 After the power shift from LDP dominance over to the DPJ in September 2009, Yukio 
Hatoyama was the first one to take the role of prime minister. Aside from the general views 
about political change mentioned in the previous chapter, one significant event occurred during 
PM Hatoyama’s term.  
In March 2010, as PM Hatoyama was already almost heading off his seat, the so-called 
“Cheonan incident” took place. A South Korean corvette, Cheonan, was sunk by a torpedo. An 
investigation conducted by a variety of international experts came to the conclusion that the 
torpedo had been fired from a North Korean submarine. This became the official position of the 
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U.S., South Korea and Japan, although still contested by the DPRK. As North Korea never 
admitted its part in the attack, the United Nations Security Council condemned the attack 
unanimously, but without officially naming the assailant.
167
 PM Hatoyama promptly expressed 
his strong condemning of the attack, but omitted any detailed comments on a future course of 
action that should be taken on the DPRK. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada, on the 
other hand, was just as vague only citing his wish for “firm measures”.168  
PM Naoto Kan of the DPJ took office after Hatoyama’s departure in June 2010. Another 
North Korea related incident followed during his term, when the island of Yeonpyeong in South 
Korea was bombarded by the DPRK’s artillery in November 2010.169 The official reason for the 
attack cited by North Korea was that it was only responding (in self-defense) to firing of shells 
first given by South Korean military towards the DPRK's territorial waters
170
. The Kan cabinet 
convened for an emergency meeting, but Japan’s reaction to the incident was in the end nothing 
noteworthy. Foreign Minister Maehara even ended up taking a softer approach to the DPRK the 
following year, as he announced that Japan would be ready to have direct talks in 2011.
171
 
 Kan managed to stir the pot with a provocative remark about Japanese troops’ possible 
activities in an emergency situation in South Korea. He mentioned that Japan had had talks with 
South Korea on the issue of “conducting rescue operations in case of contingencies," which 
hinted of a wish that SDF troops be given mandate for rescue operations concerning Japanese 
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citizens in the Korean Peninsula, especially in the case of the collapse of the DPRK regime.
172
 
The statement caused uproar due to the issue of Japan’s past militarism in the area, and at the 
same time his publicity ratings were plummeting all the way to 21%, which was the lowest yet to 
date during his term.
173
 
Ever since the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima nuclear incident PM 
Naoto Kan’s leadership was under fire constantly.  
In the end he made way for Yoshihiko Noda of the DPJ in September 2011. In his 
inauguration policy speech Noda mentioned North Korea in a rather vague way, citing the 
previous Pyongyang Declaration as a guideline in how Japan should proceed to attempt 
normalization in the future. He stated: 
 
Japan seeks to normalize its diplomatic relations with 
North Korea through the comprehensive resolution of the 
outstanding issues of concern, including the abduction, 
nuclear, and missile issues, and settling the unfortunate 
past. Regarding the abduction issue, this is a grave issue 
that relates to national sovereignty and as the 
responsibility of the State, we will spare no effort towards 
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achieving the return of all abductees to Japan at the 
earliest possible juncture.
174
 
 
 In another policy speech in January 2012 there was little change to be seen in his stance 
regarding the DPRK.
175
 However, PM Noda’s cabinet faced another North Korean missile crisis 
in April 2012, as the DPRK conducted a missile test, which although ending in another failure 
got Japan on its toes preparing for the worst as it rounded up its missile defense systems in 
preparation for the launch.  
However, the Japan-DPRK dialogue has not completely died out yet. In August 2012 
Japanese and North Korean officials held a meeting regarding a different matter – returning of 
the remains of Japanese citizens who died in territory that is currently part of the DPRK during 
World War II.
176
 After the transition of power from the deceased leader of North Korea, Kim 
Jong-Il, to his son Kim Jong-Un such gestures of good will have not been of abundance. Thus, it 
is easy to speculate that the move on behalf of the DPRK and its leader might be a show of 
willingness to open diplomatic dialogue as means of communication once again, although its 
attitude on the matter has been highly inconsistent in the past years. 
In September 2012 Japan started preliminary talks in Beijing with the DPRK on 
restarting longer term bilateral talks again. From Japan's side especially the abduction issue has 
been central for the agenda. The September developments were followed by a two-day bilateral 
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meeting in Ulan Bator, Mongolia in November.
177
 Actual concrete results gained from the 
newly-opened talks are yet unclear, but a positive speculation on the issue would point to the 
direction of the new DPRK leader Kim Jong-Un wanting to separate his policies from the 
previous decades of back-and-forth movement with the rest of the world, starting with Japan. 
 
Summary 
 In this chapter the focus of the study has been on the developments that the Japan-DPRK 
relations faced after the Cold War until 2012. The first point of focus was the history of the 
Korean Peninsula regarding Japan from a general viewpoint. This was followed by a comparison 
of Japan's and the DPRK's views on their power relations and past negotiations, and the 
reasoning by which they have conducted such negotiations. These negotiations have had highly 
fluctuating results and are as of yet today at a stalemate to a large extent. Another important 
focus was Japan's relationship with other powers solving the DPRK nuclear crisis, how the 
cooperation dynamic has worked in the past and how it has affected Japan's relationship with 
these powers. After the look on the failed Six-Party talks the focus shifted to a more detailed 
study on how the LDP leadership worked with North Korea and its various issues and crises 
from the 1990s until 2009, when the DPJ took over power in Japanese politics.  
 Since the end of the Cold War the driving force of Japan-DPRK relations from Japan's 
side has been largely its hunger for knowledge on its kidnapped citizens from the past decades, 
and having details on the Japanese wives that left to North Korea willingly previously. In 
addition to this Japan has wanted to balance its influence against its competitors South Korea and 
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China. North Korea on the other hand has had the upper hand most of the time with these issues, 
being mainly concerned on the economic assistance. It has refused to reveal much information at 
a time to Japan, retreating to its shell every time Japan has shown too much of hostile eagerness 
or demands in general to it. 
 When it comes to the different eras of leadership in Japan, some distinctive qualities can 
be seen. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the Japan-DPRK relationship was largely dealt with 
behind closed doors and with secret meetings between selected politicians from Japan that had 
managed to create long-lasting ties with the DPRK. With increasing transparency in dealing with 
the DPRK such back room dealings have been on the decline. However, with the DPRK's 
sporadic attitude towards its nuclear testing Japan's leadership qualities have had in the end little 
possibility to affect its decision-making, as can be seen from the DPRK-Japan normalization 
talks that were restarted and failed several times in the past.  
 Some, such as PM Shinzo Abe have reacted boldly to the fluctuating relations by 
deciding on unilateral sanctions on the DPRK when its tendency to continue its missile tests no 
matter what became apparent. When it comes to the DPJ's decision making on the DPRK, it has 
not to date shown any significant amount of willpower or willingness to use hardline approaches, 
although some of the most brutal incidents such as the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of 
the Yeonpyeong happened during its watch.  
 So far only prime minister Noda, who is currently in office, has managed to take the 
effort forwards in terms of future negotiations, although Japan is not seeing any major brave 
changes yet. Although the DPRK has newly tried an approach that would seem like a return to 
civilized diplomacy by returning war dead from World War II from its territories to Japan and re-
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opening negotiations with it on an international platform in Mongolia, it is unlikely that the 
DPRK has specifically taken a liking to PM Noda. Rather it can be expected that the pendulum 
may just as well swing the other way in the coming months after the negotiations, as the patter of 
the past has shown.  
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Chapter IV: Russo-Japanese relations 
 
Map 2: Map of Japan, the southern Kuriles and Sakhalin
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Chapter background 
 The relations between Japan and Russia today are to a large extent an extension of the 
ancient relations between the Russian Empire and Japan, followed by Japan-USSR (Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics) relations. Already the pre-Soviet relations between Russia and Japan 
are somewhat descriptive of the current situation in the realm of Russo-Japanese diplomacy: it is 
largely concentrated on their territorial agendas. Namely, today the two countries’ main dispute 
of concern is their strongly conflicting views on the way the fate of the Southern Kuril Islands 
north of Japan (called the Northern Territories in Japan) should be dealt with.  
Japan and Russia have had a colorful history of territorial exchanges when it comes to the 
Northern part of Japan. The first part of the chapter focuses on the history of Russo-Japanese 
territorial interactions which to a large extent laid the foundation to the present day disputes. The 
interactions are examined to give a general overview on the type of diplomacy that was practiced 
by the two countries in the past, especially in the case of the Sakhalin island and the Kurils, 
which have in the recent years seen increasing strategic defense hedging from Russia's side much 
to Japan's concern. The chapter’s main focus of concern is on the role of the Northern Territories 
dispute, and how Japanese political leadership has dealt with the issue during the years after 
around the end of the Cold War, from the 1990s to 2012. This has happened first during the era 
of LDP dominance and then after the power shift of 2009 to the DPJ, as Japan has tried to make 
its case to return the control of the islands to itself.  
The chapter looks at significant events that have affected the Russo-Japanese relations 
and how both sides have argued their case when it comes to the territorial dispute, which at the 
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moment has Russia on the leading side as it has controlled the Kuril Islands chain unilaterally 
since the end of World War II.  
 
History of Russo-Japanese relations and the Northern Territories dispute 
 
Selected history of Russo-Japanese territorial conflict 
 The earliest encounters between Russia and Japan, which was yet a closed maturing 
divided nation back then with its sakoku (isolation) policy, was in the 1700s. Russia attempted 
several times to open up relations with Japan, but at the time trade with foreigners was extremely 
harshly regulated and limited to Nagasaki and to the Dutch. Similar attempts followed in the 
coming decades but with little results. It had become a Russian dream to become the first country 
to open Japan up, and Russia went even as far as trying an approach similar to the later 
successful U.S. Commodore Perry, bringing its boats to Nagasaki and demanding opening up.
179
 
The Russian approach was not as aggressive as Perry's was later, and they were refused and 
turned back.  
 Indeed, the decisive factor was to be Commodore Perry's arrival to Edo in 1853, when 
Japan was finally forcefully told to open itself to the United States. Interaction with the rest of 
the world followed later, but much due to the kick start Perry had initiated. Diplomatic relations 
were established in 1855 with the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between Japan and 
Russia (Treaty of Shimoda). The treaty also established the border between the islands of 
Etorofu and Uruppu (Iturup and Urup), and established the island of Sakhalin as a place for co-
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habitation between the Japanese and Russians. However, the glooming beginning of a problem 
with the Northern Territories had already raised its head at this point, as Russia had in the earlier 
decades already started showing interest in the Northern islands, mapping and navigating the 
areas with interest.
180
 
 In the 1860s the conflicting interests of territorial expansionism started affecting Russo-
Japanese relations on a more serious level. Firstly, with the treaty of Peking, Russia was able to 
acquire the piece of coastline from China where it started building the military naval base of 
Vladivostok, which is at a close proximity with Japan -- an obvious military liability for Japan. 
At the same time, Japan was heading towards an emergent role of military and industrial power 
thanks to the opening up, and China on the other hand was facing significant internal weakening. 
 Both parties, Japan and Russia, were competing for Chinese territory to obtain.
181
 These 
territorial ambitions from Japan's side culminated in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, which 
ended in Japan's victory. The peace treaty (Treaty of Shimonoseki) sealed the peace. However, in 
the end Japan was denied access to the Liaodong Peninsula and the militarily important Port 
Arthur which was originally promised to Japan in the peace treaty. This was due to the "triple 
intervention" invoked by Russia, Germany and France.
182
 
 After the Meiji Restoration started in 1868, Japan (at this point Empire of Japan) was 
increasingly heading towards modernization and its territorial interests were of utmost 
importance to keep its growing role in the region stable. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 
was fought primarily on the issue of territorial importance of Korea, which Japan regarded as an 
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important buffer zone towards any kind of military movement from the surrounding countries.
183
 
However, Russia had been making movement in the area in the form of e.g. building roads 
towards Korea. Japan decided to strike first, and a declaration of war was made in 1904. Japan 
being victorious in the war has been historically seen as significant due to the fact that it was the 
first war in recorded history where an Asian nation defeated a Caucasian nation in warfare.
184
 
Treaty of Portsmouth ended the war, and as a consequence Japan received the southern half of 
the Sakhalin Island from Russia and was able to lease the Liaodong peninsula (with the militarily 
important Port Arthur) for its use.
185
  
 In 1922 hostile relations between Japan and Russia continued in the form of Japan 
supporting the anti-Bolshevik movement together with the British, Americans and French forces. 
Japan was supporting the movement in Asia, and even occupied Vladivostok during this time 
until it fell to the Red Army later on. Before World War II, in 1932, Japan started to show 
interest in Soviet territories. Japan had already invaded Manchuria, gaining more territory and 
established the Manchukuo puppet state. This was followed in 1936 with the anti-Comintern pact 
formed with Nazi Germany to counter the international communist expansion, which led to a 
sharp decline in Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations.
186
 Vladivostok, or the near area of it, 
turned out to be important when the first border skirmish of Battle of Lake Khasan broke out in 
1938 there. More was to come, and border skirmishes happened more often on the Soviet-
Manchurian border. However, nothing major happened until World War II when Japanese 
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expansionism saw its peak.
187
 It can be seen, however, that the Japanese ambitions for expansion 
already existed during this time.  
 From the Soviet side of the relations it was the time of the Yalta conference (Yalta 
agreement) that was very significant for the coming years of Russo-Japanese relations. It was in 
the Yalta conference that Josif Stalin expressed his commitment to join the war against Japan 
after the fall of Germany would come to pass. This happened in the end August of 1945 when 
the USSR systematically took over Japanese territories starting from Manchukuo and ending up 
at the Kuril Islands, which are in question today regarding the territorial dispute.
188
 
 During the Cold War Japan was firmly under the security umbrella of the United States, 
and thus fell into an opposite camp from the Soviet Union. It took Japan and the USSR until 
1956 to sign the Joint Declaration which normalized their relations after the war. However, no 
formal peace treaty was created and the situation persists even today. Talks about negotiations of 
forming a peace treaty aside with ending the territorial conflicts exist, but no tangible results 
have been reached as of yet. 
The Legacy of the Islands disputes: History of the Sakhalin issue 
 Historically speaking the Sakhalin (in Japan called Karafuto) island has been a diplomatic 
hindrance to Russo-Japanese relations since even before the modern Japanese state was 
established. First Japanese settlements were made in Sakhalin as early as Edo period, but already 
at this time there was rivalry between Russia and Japan in regards of sovereignty over the 
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area.
189
 Japan decided to fortify its position in the area by unilaterally declaring sovereignty of 
the island as early as 1845, with the idea that it was an extension of its northernmost main island, 
Hokkaido. The same thing was done in the case of the Kuril islands at the time. However, the 
Russians already at this point contested the idea of Japanese sovereignty and responded by 
moving more people to the island and establishing coal mines, schools, prisons and churches in 
the area.
190
 
 The 1855 Japan-Russia Commerce Treaty (Treaty of Shimoda) established the idea that 
both parties could coexist on the island. The area saw a North-South split, with Japanese on the 
South side and Russians on the northern one. However, a problem existed with the fact that no 
clear border between the Japanese and Russian settlements existed although the island was 
technically under joint sovereignty. Thus, there was still plenty of leeway for further arguments 
from both sides. The 1875 Sakhalin-Kuril Islands Exchange Treaty (Treaty of St. Petersburg) 
brought a change to the situation.
191
 Japan received the Kuril Islands chain, and the Russians 
were now in full control of the Sakhalin island. Another development followed after the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-05, when Japan received again the southern part of Sakhalin below 
the  50° N with the Treaty of Portsmouth.192 At this time Japan called the southern part of 
Sakhalin Karafuto-cho (according to the Japanese name for the island) with Toyohara (today's 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk) as the capital. However, the present day problems followed after the end of 
World War II.  
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 In 1945, in accordance with the Yalta agreement (agreement reached by United States, 
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on post-war arrangements), Russia took over Sakhalin 
and called it an officially integrated part of Russia. A major evacuation and repatriation of 
Japanese and a partial one of Korean inhabitants followed. Many of the Koreans were refused 
repatriation to Japan, thus they had no choice but to stay on the island as "Sakhalin Koreans". 
The 2002 Russian census indicates that 333 ethnic Japanese still inhabit the island, being 0.06% 
of the island's population.
193
 With the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan officially ceded its 
claim to the Sakhalin Island, but it did not also recognize Russia's dominance over it. A major 
reason for this was the fact that the USSR was never a party to the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
which ended the war.  
 Even though it can be seen that from the official political side Japan has mostly already 
given up on the idea of there being any realistic chance for the return of Sakhalin from the 
Russians (very much unlike in the case of the Kurils), arguments backing Japanese right to the 
island persist from grassroots level. Historically speaking the mapping and exploration of the 
island was done very early by the Japanese, and was largely inhabited by the Japanese ethnic 
minority, the Ainu people, who gave it its original name.
194
 Of course, the historical sentiment 
and moral right argument applies only so far, since the legal right to the island has already been 
given up by the Japanese.  
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The Legacy of the Islands disputes: History of the Kurils issue 
 There are many coinciding factors with the Sakhalin island case and the current dispute 
with the Northern Territories issue. In fact, the naming of the islands as "Kurils" is also of 
controversy, as the naming will also affect the eventual fate of the country that has legal right to 
the islands. The Japanese inhabited the Kurils from the Edo period, and the four islands in 
question with today's dispute are the southernmost ones north of Hokkaido: Kunashiri, Etorofu 
(Iturup), Shikotan and Habomai.
195
 The treaties of 1875 and 1905 are of importance from the 
Japanese perspective. As mentioned earlier, in 1875 Japan gained full control of the Kurils in 
exchange for Sakhalin Island. Similarly to the Sakhalin case, in the aftermath of World War II 
the Soviets took over the Kuril Islands. However, in the case of these islands it is important to 
note that this was done after Japan had already surrendered unconditionally.
196
 
 One opinion is that that the surrender was actually the trigger for the Soviet invasion on 
the islands, as Stalin had a plan to take over Hokkaido as well - this of course was not a part of 
the Yalta agreement and the plan never materialized.
197
 There is also the persisting question of 
original ownership of the islands, as Japan states that it had the claim to them since much earlier 
than during World War II, but Russia did not. This can make Russia's stance on taking them over 
during the aftermath of World War II look rather like aggressive opportunism than something 
that was done to end the war. Of course, from the Russian perspective the islands would be seen 
as legitimate "spoils of war" and the Yalta agreement can be interpreted as claiming the same.  
 However, whether the Yalta agreement was in any way binding is another case as it is 
called -- just an agreement between the powers that be, not a legal document sanctioned by 
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international law, although sometimes called the "Yalta Treaty". Historically speaking, peace 
treaties have been the tool to settle territorial disputes, but as one has not been reached yet 
between Russia and Japan, the case is left open from the Japanese perspective. The Yalta 
agreement is also hindered by its ambiguous writing style (perhaps done on purpose back at the 
time of drafting), which has led the participating parties and the states in question (such as Japan) 
to have several interpretations to its content. One of the key questions is whether the Yalta 
agreement applies to the "Northern Territories" at all, in the case that they are not a part of the 
Kuril chains in the first place. 
 On the other hand, President Truman's statement to Stalin in 1945 speaks its own 
language about how dangerous this leeway within the Yalta agreement turned out to be:  
 
You evidently misunderstood my message [about the Kuril 
Islands].... I was not speaking of any territory of the Soviet 
Republic. I was speaking of the Kurile Islands, Japanese 
territory, disposition of which must be made at a peace 
settlement.
198
 
 
 This key piece of evidence has brought light to the early U.S. position on the matter (that 
the Yalta agreement did not apply to the Northern Territories, and that the issue should be 
concluded bilaterally by Russia and Japan), but as expected Russia rejected this position 
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entirely.
199
 This was likely due to the fact that it was already in control of the areas at that point, 
and did not want to reopen the case any further.  
 Another point of interest is the 1943 Cairo Declaration's statement that "Japan will also be 
expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed."
200
 As mentioned, 
if Russia did not have claim to the Kurils prior to 1945, it is hard to imagine the four southern 
islands of the chain to have been obtained by violence and greed by Japan in the first place. 
Russia was also openly criticized by the U.S. for not fulfilling the Yalta agreement accordingly, 
but instead seemingly demanding only the fulfillment of the parts of the agreement that are to its 
liking instead, such as keeping all the islands north of Hokkaido permanently instead of 
negotiating the issue of the Northern Territories with Japan.
201
 
 The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (Japanese-Soviet Nonaggression Pact) of 1941 is 
another point of interest to look at. It can be argued that the USSR's decision to enter the war in 
1945 was a violation of international laws, as the agreement even though canceled on April 5th 
of 1945, was still in effect until April 13th of 1946.
202
 Most importantly, the main Japanese 
argument in the case is actually related to the naming of the islands. Japan remains at the position 
that the four contested islands are actually not a part of the Kuril island chain which is mentioned 
in the Article 2c of the San Francisco Treaty, which would nullify the Russian argument.  
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 The earliest mentions from Japan about the position of Etorofu and Kunashiri not being 
part of the Kurils can be traced to the drafting of the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration that 
normalized diplomatic relations.
203
 The Kuril Islands issue was not solved at this point, as Russia 
and Japan agreed to postpone it until a permanent peace treaty would be reached. 
 Japan remained with this statement regarding the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri ever 
since the Joint Declaration was drafted, but Russia did not accept it back then similarly to the 
current situation where the two states remain at a stalemate in negotiations. Moreover, according 
to the Japanese logic, as Russia refused to sign the 1951 San Francisco treaty it should not have 
had any right to the islands in the first place. Rather, the Russian takeover of the islands can be 
perhaps seem more comparable to looting as Japan had already surrendered at the point of the 
takeover.  
 However, the Japanese arguments have been contested by western historians as tactics of 
expansion, as evidence of Japanese statesmen admitting that the four islands were included in the 
Kuril islands when the Joint Declaration was drafted, has surfaced.
204
 Seokwoo Lee cites an 
October 1951 Diet of Japan session where Director of Treaties Bureau of Foreign Ministry of 
Japan, Kumao Nishimura, includes the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri to the Kuril Islands 
chain.
205
 This, on the other hand, would argue against the common Japanese statement that the 
Northern Territories (including the aforementioned islands) are a separate entity from the Kurils. 
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 The Northern Territories problem has not only affected Japan’s international relations 
with its northern neighbor. Alexander Bukh argued in his 2012 paper that there has been a split 
between the Japanese people whose livelihoods are directly affected by the territorial row, and 
the Japanese government, which has turned the dispute into a major “national mission”.206 
 
Russo-Japanese relations under the LDP in the 1990s 
Fluctuating relations towards normalization 
 Japan's relations with first the Soviet Union and then the newly established Russian 
Federation under the LDP in the 1990s saw a high level of fluctuation between a possible 
glimpse of hope for finding a way to solve the territorial problem towards an official peace treaty. 
The main reason for the fluctuation was the fact that both sides, although hopeful and eager to 
end the dispute, were in the end highly reluctant to be flexible with the territorial problem. One 
of the closest examples of such possible breakthroughs was when the USSR offered Japan two of 
the smallest islands in the Northern Territories. This plan, however, never materialized. One of 
the main reasons for the inflexibility with the issue has been nationalistic pressures on each 
country's home front. 
 Before the impending collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan met with the other G7 
countries in 1990 with the LDP's Toshiki Kaifu as its Prime Minister. The meeting was held in 
Houston, Texas. Japan managed to get a word in about its case for furthering its claim with the 
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Northern Territories dispute by having its resolution being a priority added to the list of agendas 
of the meeting.
207
 At the same time PM Kaifu was trying out similar diplomacy with the other 
G7 countries by removing Japan's Defense White Paper notes about the Soviet Union being a 
danger in the Far East, something that Japan had been releasing regularly since the 1980s.
208
  
 This did not mean that Japan was completely removing its preparedness or wariness for 
the situation with the USSR in the region. Junzo Nakano writes:  
 
[...] within the 1990 White Paper, the references to Soviet 
Far East military forces being a "source of the increased 
military tensions" remained. Furthermore, in the 1991 
edition, a similar reference was made. 
209
 
 
 Although the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, and 
the power shift the collapse brought with it did start to bring eventual amelioration to the tension, 
Japan saw Russian forces in the Far East still holding an uncomfortably strong presence.  
 In 1993, under Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa of the brief era of non-LDP 
dominance (The Japan New Party was at the handle), the Tokyo Declaration on Russo-Japanese 
relations brought on increased sense of secured ties and improvement.
210
 The era of the Tokyo 
Declaration saw increased hope for a long delayed formal peace treaty since the end of World 
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War II. The Tokyo Declaration was one step from Japan's side towards realizing a more loosened 
policy, away from the strict non-separation of the territory issue and economic relations with 
Russia.
211
 
 Although the economy factor had started gradually to be seen as more important than 
before from Japan's side, the Northern Territories issue continued to be a dominating factor for 
shifts in tone for the relations. Ultimately little actual progress was seen after the Tokyo 
Declaration on the territorial frontier.  
 An example case of fluctuation in the relations was in 1992. Then Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin's attitude towards the dispute seeming initially open-minded, a breakthrough 
meeting in Japan was expected. Japan was offering Russia billions of dollars in aid with the 
condition that the islands dispute be settled for good.
212
 President Yeltsin had initially been 
quoted even as saying that he believes that the islands should be returned to Japan. However, the 
ameliorating relations saw a harsh setback due to pressures from the conservative forces on 
Russia's side. With the increased pressures from the home front the Russian president decided to 
cancel his official state visit to Japan that year.
213
 The constant danger to Yeltsin from the 
Russian home front was not exactly anything new at this point, as not too long ago, in August 
1991 the Soviet conservatives had attempted a coup against the president.
214
 From this example 
one can see that the nationalistic pressures on the islands issue are severe from both sides.  
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The Krasnoyarsk Prospect and the Kawana Proposal 
 The next hope for major concrete steps of improvement with Russo-Japanese relations 
happened in 1997 under Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of the LDP. In his speech to the 
Japan's Association of Corporate Executives he emphasized the coming importance of mutual 
interests with Russia and aiming for better relations in the long run.
215
 Hashimoto met with the 
Yeltsin the same year unofficially in the Russian city of Krasnoyarsk, which led to an 
understanding that the it would be in both of their interests to come up with an official peace 
treaty by 2000.
216
 During the talks Japan took initiative in proposing a plan known as the 
'Hashimoto-Yeltsin' plan, which aimed at a deeper economic interaction. The main agendas to 
implement through the plan were as follows: 
 
1. Investment Cooperation Initiative 
2. Russia's incorporation in the global economy 
3. Enlargement of reform assistance 
4. Management training program 
5. Strengthening of the energy dialogue 
6. Peaceful utilization of nuclear power 
7. Space cooperation
217
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 The developments of 1997 led into the signing of an agreement for 100 million dollars in 
loans to Russia's developmental projects in the Far East.
218
  
 The gradual economic loosening of the relations continued as in 1998. Supian and Nosov 
write:  
 
In February 1998 it was announced that the Japanese 
Export-Import Bank, through the international Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or World Bank), 
had granted Russia unrestricted credit in the about of $1.5 
billion.
219
 
 
 A second attempt at an informal meeting between Yeltsin and Hashimoto followed in 
1998 in Kawana. This is where PM Hashimoto tried to resolve the territorial dispute once and for 
all by offering concessions. He suggested a border demarcation between the two islands of 
Etorofu and Uruppu (Iturup and Urup).
220
 Unfortunately the main issue of a peace treaty never 
took hold in concrete terms in the end during Yeltsin's time, as both governments attitudes 
towards each other kept following the patterns of fluctuation.  
 In addition, the promising connection between Hashimoto and Yeltsin became less useful 
as Hashimoto had to step down as prime minister due to the LDP's defeat in the elections of July 
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1998.
221
 The territorial dispute, and Russia's later demands to complete the process for peace by 
leaving the dispute unsettled made it virtually impossible for Japan to even consider accepting 
the terms, and the stalemate situation remained the same.
222
  
 Towards the end of the 1990s, in 1999 Japan and Russia tried to hasten the yet hopeful 
process of talks due to Yeltsin's oncoming visit to Japan during the LDP's PM Keizo Obuchi's 
term. A "border demarcation committee" was established to help with entertaining the idea of a 
compromise to ensure the existence of at least some kinds of results towards the Presidential 
visit.
223
 However, the effects were to an extent quite the contrary; the effort only showed both 
parties how far they in fact were from finding a viable solution to the issue. As the improbability 
of the previously hopeful year 2000 peace treaty plan became increasingly obvious, Japan was 
going as far as to consider Russia's old 1950s compromise suggestion on returning only two of 
the islands (Shikotan and the Habomai group, the smallest of the Southern Kurils and closest to 
Japan) and settling the issue once and for all through this.
224
 The plan never went through, and 
the fluctuating relationship once again fell into the static state of a stalemate. 
 In the end, the hopeful Krasnoyarsk suggestion for finding a way to conclude a peace 
treaty by 2000 was perhaps highly unrealistic to begin with, considering the difficult history of 
the negotiations that have seen very little flexibility from both sides. First of all, at this point 
President Yeltsin was known to be a big speaker when it came to hopeful promises, but his 
promises were rarely kept to their full extent. This kind of enthusiastic good intentions over 
realistic considerations were a miscalculation from Russia's part.
225
 From Japan's side it had 
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turned out to be a fatal error in judgment to place its hopes in this wager which was unlikely to 
bring results. 
 
Russo-Japanese relations under the LDP in the 2000s 
The Irkutsk Statement 
 In March 2001 former prime minister Yoshihiro Mori met with the Russian president 
Vladimir Putin in the Russian city of Irkutsk. The main agenda of the meeting was to negotiate 
on reaching a permanent peace treaty.
226
 Although nothing binding on the peace treaty was 
decided on in Irkutsk, they reached an agreement on the so called Irkutsk Statement, which 
reaffirmed both sides' wish to work with "utmost efforts" towards a peace treaty in addition to 
talks on increased economic cooperation.
227
 
 Coming to the 2000s the Northern Territories issue was still the main source of problems 
for the Russo-Japanese relations, and Japan's objective of bargaining for the Northern Territories 
had not changed. Minor political incidents such as the governor of the Sakhalin oblast (area of 
both the Sakhalin area and the Kurils) accusing Japan of spreading propaganda about the fate of 
the islands took place.
228
  
 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's coming into office was another development, as he 
took office in April 2001 and the Russian Premier Vladimir Putin officially invited him for a 
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visit. During the end of PM Mori's term and the beginning of PM Koizumi's term there was still 
hope left for an agreement on the islands issue. However, Togo writes:  
 
And yet again, seven months of negotiations ended when 
Makiko Tanaka, daughter of the late Prime Minister 
Kakuei Tanaka, assumed the post of Minister for Foreign 
Affairs at the end of April 2001. The total confusion which 
occurred between the Foreign Minister and the Foreign 
Ministry officials paralyzed many aspects of Japanese 
foreign policy, including its Russian policy.
229
 
 
 What Togo refers to is that as foreign minister, Tanaka had already from before gained a 
reputation of having a direct and confrontational style, clashing with other officials of the 
ministry, who had their own interests to protect. These open clashes over "personnel transfers, 
reform steps and policy issues," and allegations of mishandling of her secretaries' salaries 
eventually led to her losing the position in 2002.
230
 She was also much criticized for her lack of 
knowledge when it came to international diplomacy.
231
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 In the end nothing concrete was accomplished in the meeting, as both parties continued 
their inflexible stances when it came to the Northern Territories dispute and their differentiating 
views on the 1956 Declaration which normalized Russo-Japanese relations.
232
 
 In fact, it would seem that both sides had increasingly hardened stances on the issue 
especially further towards Koizumi's term. In 2002 it became apparent that there were to be very 
little space for negotiation between the countries, as Russia's deputy Foreign Minister Losyukov 
voiced out loud his feeling that the relations were at a declined state.
233
 
The Six-Point Action Plan 
 By the time of PM Koizumi's next visit to Russia in 2003, however, further fluctuation 
occurred as hopeful six-point action plan had been established by cooperation from both parties 
for the betterment of relations. The main points of the plan included: 
 
1. Deepening of Political Dialogue 
2. Peace Treaty Negotiations 
3. Cooperation in the International Arena 
4. Cooperation in the Trade and Economic Areas 
5. Development of Relations in Defense and Security 
6. Advancements in Cultural and Interpersonal 
Exchange.
234
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 Not only was the plan drafted, during his visit to Russia PM Koizumi ended up signing 
the plan with the Russian Premier. This could be seen as one of the biggest developments in the 
relations in decades, as it was a concrete step towards positive development. However, from a 
realistic point of view the plan's actual possibility to do anything else than reiterate the previous 
hopeful scenarios was dim, as it left out any future development plans with the territorial dispute. 
 In his 2003 policy speech PM Koizumi reaffirmed thoughts from Japan's side as he spoke 
in a fashion that made it clear that the situation regarding the Northern Territories was still far 
from being solved, although hope was not to be abandoned completely: 
 
Between Japan and Russia, there remains a "negative 
legacy of the 20th century", in the issue of where the 
islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu 
belong. I firmly believe there is great potential for 
development of the relations between Japan and Russia. In 
reality, however, our two countries have realized only a 
small portion of such development potential, partly because 
of the existence of the abovementioned issue.
235
 
 
 Aside from the realistic point of view of his statement, on the bilateral level aside from 
the territorial dispute Russo-Japanese relations saw another development as they started up a 
telephone hotline for the leaders to communicate with in emergencies. The economic 
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development part of the 2003 action plan also was one of the most likely ones to succeed, as 
Japanese interest in terms of investments in the Russian Far East was undeniable in potential.
236
 
 The year 2005 was coincidentally good for diplomatic occasion between Japan and 
Russia, as it marked anniversaries of three major events in Russo-Japanese history: the 150th of 
the signing of the Treaty of Shimoda of 1855, 100th anniversary of the end of Russo-Japanese 
War of 1905 and the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II. With Junichiro Koizumi still 
on the PM seat, Japan used the opportunity to open up the discussion on the islands dispute once 
again. However, Koizumi's initiative was shadowed by the fact that he had in 2004 become the 
first prime minister to get closer to the islands for an 'inspection', which was highly controversial 
on the Russian side.
237
 The situation in the end resulted in a back-and-forth of arguments from 
the Japanese and Russian media, where both leaders expressed their rather nationalist sounding 
views to please their audiences.
238
 
 In 2006, During Koizumi's last months as Prime Minister another incident regarding the 
islands took place as a Japanese fisherman was shot to death by Russian coast guard near the 
disputed territory, while the rest of the crew were detained. Although Japanese fishermen getting 
detained had been a regular issue between the countries, fatalities in such incidents had been 
extremely rare.
239
 The situation was a major blow to the hopeful thinkers expecting the 
anniversary of the relations to bring some kind of positive development to the ties. 
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 In 2008, as Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda of the LDP had taken office, a common topic 
when facing anti-Japanese sentiment (textbook revisions) arose, complicating diplomatic ties 
with Russia. Plans for school textbook guidelines in Japan, which would cite the Kurils to be 
Japanese territory, spread in the media. This resulted in Russia giving its official statement to 
denounce the action as counter-productive for the relations.
240
 
 In 2009 Prime Minister Taro Aso of the LDP met with the Russian President Medvedev 
on the Sakhalin island. This meeting was followed by Russian Prime Minister Putin meeting 
with PM Aso in Japan. To no extreme surprise, the hopeful atmosphere that these two meetings 
had created crumbled soon enough, as PM Aso the same year publicly blurted out his view 
during a Japanese budget committee meeting that the Russian occupation of the islands is in the 
end "illegal".
241
 Nationalistic sentiment had once again defeated diplomacy, and the issue 
remained at a stalemate. 
 
Russo-Japanese relations and the rise of the DPJ 
 The events in 2009 were followed by the Democratic Party of Japan victory at the ballots. 
In general the DPJ proved to have a rather mild approach towards Russia during 2009-2012. 
While Russia was increasing its presence on the Kurils, Japan was avoiding confrontation. This 
was likely largely due to the fact that it had its hands full with the worsening Sino-Japanese 
situation of the Senkaku islands.  
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 The first proposal for positive development with the Russo-Japanese relations during the 
DPJ came with PM Yukio Hatoyama. The DPJ's first prime minister had in September 
announced a hopeful and positive view on future Russo-Japanese relations as he pointed out that 
"building a trusting relationship with Russian leaders was the key to solving a decades-long 
dispute over four islands seized by the Soviet Union in 1945" being a part of his policy.
242
 He 
also had his grandfather's name to his side, as the former PM Ichiro Hatoyama was the first 
Japanese PM to ever visit the USSR and was a familiar name to the Russians.
243
  
 However, with his meeting with the Russian leader Medvedev in 2009 his stance already 
seemed stricter. As Medvedev was interested in talking about flexibility and the importance of 
economy between Japan and Russia, Hatoyama insisted that the two topics of economy and 
territory are strictly connected like "two wheels of a cart."
244
 This was in a way an unexpected 
step towards looking at Japan's past policy of non-separation of the issues, which had gradually 
been loosening already since the late 1990s. 
 On the other hand, the next year Hatoyama was already proudly newscast as "vowing to 
resolve the territorial row with Russia."
245
 However, PM Hatoyama did not in the end gain any 
major positive advancement with the Russian issue. From one aspect, his words often seemed to 
be too optimistic considering the fact that he was not ready to continue in a different direction 
from his predecessors when it comes to furthering flexibility with the territorial issue. This was 
important especially due to the fact that the economic relations between Russia and Japan had 
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seen some serious advancement before Hatoyama's term. Hatoyama causing the inseparability of 
the territorial and economic topics to resurface seems counterproductive. 
 His follower, PM Naoto Kan's term saw more provocative developments from Russia's 
side on the islands, as the Russian President Medvedev visited the Kurils in the latter half of 
2010, meeting local inhabitants and announced plans for further development on the islands. 
246
 
PM Kan's role was to contribute to the back-and-forth of the diplomatic rows by announcing the 
Japanese government's view of Russia's move as "regrettable".
247
  
 No major backlash followed on the issue from Japan's side, but Russia's stance on the 
issue seemed firmer than ever. The fact that President Medvedev was the first Russian leader to 
ever travel to the islands also sent a clear message to Japan. Later on Medvedev also, to no 
surprise, stated his firm plans to continue such visits. Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara 
on the other hand managed to make Japan's stance on the issue even more sheepish, as he only 
stated that it would "hurt the Japanese people's feelings." 
248
  
 At the end of PM Kan's term Russia announced further plans for the islands in terms of 
active defense capability, as President Medvedev further emphasized his stance that the islands 
are an "inseparable part of the country and a strategic Russian region."
249
 
 Later in 2011 since PM Yoshihiko Noda took over leadership in Japan, the situation with 
the stalemate has not seen much movement from Japan's part and has remained confidently 
active from Russia's side. A ministerial meeting between Russia and Japan is in the planning for 
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December 2012 with the territorial dispute in mind, but Japan's stance on the issue seems 
extremely dormant at the moment. PM Noda's January 2012 policy speech mentioned the 
previously central Northern Territories issue only in passing.
250
 
 
Summary 
 In this chapter the focus has been on the history of Russo-Japanese relations, with the 
territorial disputes that cause schism between the two states even today, in mind. The complex 
and yet extremely disputed history of Japan's territorial issues with Russia was looked upon since 
the pre-Soviet times, as the very same areas are of issue even today between the two countries. 
While the question over Sakhalin island has been settled between the two governments over the 
Northern Territories problem and the diplomatic row has kept back-and-forth fluctuations in the 
Russo-Japanese relations going on for decades.  
 The 1990s saw a time of continued attempts to keep the negotiations alive. Especially the 
Tokyo Declaration of 1993, and later negotiations in Krasnoyarsk and Kawana gave hope for 
future warming of relations. At the same time the economic sector was developing due to Japan's 
loosening policy of non-separation between the issues of economy and territory.  
 Still during the LDP's era, the early 2000s saw another hopeful time during the transition 
period from PM Mori to PM Koizumi. The negotiations, however, died due to unclear 
policymaking after Makiko Tanaka took the Foreign Minister's office. PM Koizumi also 
managed to cause controversy by initiating an 'inspection' of the islands. During his follower PM 
                                                 
250 "Japan, Russia agree to arrange Noda's Russia trip in Dec.," Kyodo News, September 8, 2012, 
http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2012/09/181193.html; also Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (2012, 
January 24). 
 
 96 
 
Fukuda's term a textbook revision controversy arose likewise, further causing distancing between 
Japan and Russia when it came to solving the territorial issue. Fukuda's follower, PM Aso, also 
caused further controversy on the Russian side by describing the occupation of the islands as 
illegal. 
 Further into the 2000s the level of communication on the territorial issue had much 
deteriorated into a self-repeating exchange of decided hard-line policies from both sides. During 
the DPJ's era PM Hatoyama took a step back by reconnecting the issues of territory and economy 
in his statement, while President Medvedev was gesturing for flexibility. Hatoyama's follower, 
PM Kan, on the other hand had to witness further provocative action from Russia's side as it 
started to increase its high-level personnel visits on the islands and implementing plans for 
boosting security on them.  
 Subsequently, during the current PM Noda's term a stalemate between Russia and Japan 
on the Kuril Islands continues. At the moment only Russia has proven to be making serious 
proactive effort in keeping its influence on the islands issue dangerously clear by increasing its 
defense capabilities on them. The Japanese government, on the other hand, has shown a trend of 
waning rigor when it comes to keeping the discussion on the issue alive, likely due to its more 
imminent territorial threat of the Senkaku islands from China's side. 
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Chapter V: Discussion and conclusion 
 
 This chapter looks at the findings from the three case studies of China, North Korea and 
Russia from several viewpoints. As stated in Chapter I, the research framework that relies on a 
comparative analysis between security issues and policies within the LDP and DPJ periods, is 
used to look at the progress Japan's political climate saw in the past and present towards the main 
research question of "How have Japanese relations with China, North Korea and Russia 
developed in the post-Cold War era in terms of Japanese security under the LDP and the DPJ?".  
 This chapter first analyzes the findings on how the early history of Japan's relations with 
its three neighboring countries relates to the current security environment and the territorial 
disputes.  
 After an analysis on the importance of the historical aspect discussed at the beginning of 
each case study chapter, this chapter addresses the findings on LDP and DPJ policies towards the 
security issues and the main security events that took place under them until the year 2012.  
 Finally, this chapter looks at the findings on the main question and concludes whether the 
DPJ has been able to differentiate its approaches and policies in comparison to the LDP after its 
victory in 2009. 
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Role of Japan's early historical relations with China, North Korea and Russia 
The People's Republic of China 
 The debate around the Senkaku islands has been especially harsh in the recent years. The 
interpretation of the Sino-Japanese history is the key element that allows the debate to exist in 
the first place. As mentioned in Chapter II, especially from China's side the arguments for the 
islands' ownership rely heavily on old historical evidence such as maps and imperial Chinese 
documents made prior to the 19th century, while Japan insists with its argument that the islands 
were no-man's-land when taken by Japan. The motive for using these early historical documents 
to gain access to the islands from China's side still faces harsh criticism. As mentioned in 
Chapter II, the claims grew heavy only after natural resources were found around the islands in 
the 1970s. As per to the historical aspect of this research, from the case study findings it is clear 
that history plays an important part in the territorial spat over the Senkaku islands. However, 
whether the historical findings from China's side are only used as a tool for opportunism is 
another issue. In this sense, two categories of Senkaku arguments can be created: one that 
acknowledges the importance of China's claim to the islands on the grounds of the historical 
evidence, and another that sees China's claim for the islands as a more recent issue starting 
around the 1970s. 
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
 The Japan-DPRK relations, being mainly concerned on the security of the whole region 
due to the nuclear threat, are of different kind from the territorial spats. The difficult history 
between the two countries, however, contributes to the issue. Japan is not by any means the only 
country in the region concerned about the DPRK's explicit ambitions to go nuclear. However, the 
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fact that historically speaking North Korea has had a tendency to treat Japan as a natural enemy, 
partially to strengthen the original hero legend of Kim Il-Sung, contributes to the difficult 
relations. The fact that Japan's invasions on the Korean peninsula go as far as the 16th century is 
another contributing factor. North Korea's confrontationist policy was also easy to take further 
after World War II, as Japan finally lost its control over the Korean peninsula and all the 
previous colonies were treated as victims. In this sense, the legacy of Japan's World War II 
aggression gave the leaders of the DPRK the perfect, most important tool of anti-Japanese 
indoctrination which strongly presents itself even today as the two have no official diplomatic 
ties. Due to these factors, the findings of the case study point to the fact that the early historical 
events contribute to the non-existence of official Japan-DPRK relations in the 21st century. The 
lack of official diplomatic relations left the informal channel open during the LDP period mainly 
to keep tabs on the Japanese wives issue and to make sure anti-Japanese sentiment in South 
Korea would not get out of control. 
The Russian Federation 
 The islands in question with the Northern Territories dispute between Japan and Russia 
saw several developments before 1945 when Russia took over the Kuril Islands chain. Russia 
had in the past been in control of the Kurils as well, before it ceded them to Japan with the 1875 
Treaty of St. Petersburg. This past control over the islands can be speculated to be part of the 
original Russian longing to retake its control over them. In addition to this Japan had also in the 
past shown significant expansionism within territories that Russia subsequently took over in 
1945 before acquiring the Kurils. In short, Japan and Russia have had an active past of rivaling 
territorial ambitions. Thus, it is not surprising that Russia wanted to gain more foothold in the 
region by taking the Kurils permanently after World War II. In this sense, judging by the 
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findings from the historical case study on Russia it can be said that the historical territorial 
rivalries between Russia and Japan had an impact on the fact that Russia wanted to expand its 
territory near Japan; an opportunity that arose after the Yalta conference in 1945. The Northern 
Territories issue with Russia is still closely connected to the normalization declaration of 1954 
(which considers the returning of two of the islands), and has throughout the post-Cold War 
period until present day maintained its status as the bottom line for hope of negotiations. 
 
The LDP and DPJ: Security issues and policies, achievements and failures 
 The LDP from the early 1990s saw the beginnings of a rising China, which also led to the 
growing popularity of the China Threat Theory inside the Japanese government. The original 
"China school" of experts was soon gone from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and this affected 
Japanese policymaking making it wary of unintentionally supporting China's rise to possible 
hegemony through technological trade. At the same time Japan still had to face accusations from 
China's side about the burden of its wartime past, which led to a certain level of carefulness 
whenever dealing with China, although the Senkaku islands issue was flaring up already at this 
point. The DPJ, on the other hand, has proceeded to have very different policies within the terms 
of its three prime ministers on China. This had become evident especially after the Senkaku issue 
had grown to a far larger proportion than what it was during the 1990s and 2000s under the LDP. 
The era of apologizing seems to be over, as China continues its assertiveness. 
 With North Korea, the LDP saw decades of back-and-forth of negotiations after the 
original negotiator who was seen as having promise, Shin Kanemaru of the LDP, was out of the 
picture. The LDP's policy of keeping the abductions issue a main priority with the DPRK made 
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the original bilateral negotiations and the later multilateral negotiations complicated. The 
sporadic nature of North Korea's amelioration efforts which were followed with abrupt missile 
tests also caused the LDP's policy on North Korea to be generally reactive, with its biggest 
weapon being cutting of food aid and sanctions. However, after the original Six-Party talks fell 
through once and for all in 2009, the movement on the DPRK sector under the DPJ governments 
has been slight. In regards to the centrality of the abductions issue, solving it has held a strong 
bipartisan support within the government. In this sense, whether it is the LDP or the DPJ in 
power the issue is almost certain to stay central to the government’s DPRK policy. 
 With Russia, the LDP era faced several hopeful negotiations towards a peace treaty and 
finding a solution to the Northern Territories issue. Although many of the meetings such as those 
between Japan and Russian presidents Yeltsin and Putin only gave results that worked towards a 
growing economic cooperation and postponement of the Northern Territories decision, hope for 
continuation of the talks was alive most of the time. During the DPJ's era this gap between Japan 
and Russia on the Northern Territories issue has become larger. Japan faces a largely 
unprecedented situation of having a very diminishing stack of bargaining chips for negotiating 
with Russia at this point. The original (once hopeful) plan of conceding to taking only two 
smaller islands is in the past. Russia with its actions of security developments on the islands has 
shown its intention of going for a permanent solution, and policymaking from Japan's side has no 
choice but to be reactive depending on Russia's future actions. 
 Overall, in comparison many of the movements inside the LDP during its long rule after 
the Cold War were small compared to the "pendulum swings" Japan is seeing today with the 
DPJ's first three prime ministers and their priorities, preferences and policies. The security 
alliance with the United States was always a priority to keep in mind for the LDP, and this was 
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evident especially during the early and mid 2000s under PM Koizumi. The DPJ, on the other 
hand, has seen much more fluctuation inside the party with its policies during the short while it 
has been in power with its three prime ministers Hatoyama, Kan, and Noda. 
The three Prime Ministers of the DPJ: Hatoyama, Kan and Noda 
 The DPJ's era in power has seen three prime ministers during whose terms the so called 
swinging pendulum effect has been evident in policy focuses.  
 During the DPJ's first prime minister Yukio Hatoyama's time, the main issue the DPJ's 
reputation was hanging on was the planned relocation of the Futenma Air Station from Okinawa, 
as he himself made it an important part of the DPJ manifesto. Although largely linked to 
domestic politics, the Futenma issue was deeply connected to Hatoyama's plan of moving Japan 
away from too much U.S. control. The DPJ's policy at this time was largely revolving around 
aiming at switching to a more independent decision making process from the U.S. security 
umbrella. This attempt aimed at making the two more equal partners in terms of security. This 
was one end where the pendulum was swinging at -- growing independence from the U.S. 
influence, and at the same time emphasizing the importance of ties with Asia, namely China. 
Considering the fact that Japan's strong alliance with the United States has historically been 
important to how strongly Japan can deal with China (without the constant backing of the U.S. 
Japan would not have much if any credibility), this was a bold attempt at change.  
 After much confusion on his means to achieve such a difficult task of convincing the U.S. 
decision makers to agree with him on the Futenma issue, Hatoyama budged and admitted that he 
had been overly ambitious and given especially the people of Okinawa false hope with the issue. 
However, his policy of reducing the emphasis on the U.S. security alliance had already made a 
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mark as the DPJ's first major step away from decades of LDP tradition of keeping it as one of the 
main priorities. The extreme end of the pendulum swing Hatoyama was aiming at with his 
foreign policy proved highly unsustainable, as the the American troops in Japan were by any 
scale too important a factor to simply undermine in such a way.   
 At the same time as a part of the effort of making Japan a more independent leader in the 
region, a much talked topic during the 2009 elections was Hatoyama's idea of the "East Asian 
Community". This idea proved to go nowhere as well, as criticisms started piling up and the 
roles of power players such as Japan and China in the framework of the EAC were yet largely 
ambiguous. In the end none of the DPJ prime ministers managed to create any concrete results 
regarding the almost utopian East Asian Community idea by 2012.  
 One of the major changes regarding Sino-Japanese relations during Hatoyama's term was 
the fact that Japan started downplaying the human rights issues of China (perhaps towards a 
better relations with the Chinese leaders who he was approaching with his new U.S. policy). The 
last leaders of the LDP had kept these issues more surfaced compared to the DPJ.  
 In the case of the DPRK Hatoyama faced the sinking of the Cheonan during his term. The 
prime minister did not take a hardliner policy towards this issue despite his previous talk about 
making Japan a more powerful player in the region with a more equal relationship with the 
United States, but very much followed the rest of the world leaders' condemning reactions 
towards the DPRK.  The dilemma of the status of the American troops on Okinawa was not 
Hatoyama's only promise that proved to be too much to chew. In the case of Russia Hatoyama 
once again made promises that he could not possibly keep, as he vowed to solve the territorial 
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row with Russia during his term, but in the end did not manage to create any concrete results 
before having to step down in the aftermath of the Futenma fiasco. 
 Hatoyama's follower, prime minister Naoto Kan's task was to show that he would not 
follow the same path and would bring actual change to the political arena. Surprisingly, the 
political pendulum inside the DPJ swung to the other side in regards to some of the main policies 
of the DPJ election platform. PM Kan proved not to be so interested in Hatoyama's East Asian 
Community idea, and the plan was virtually forgotten during his term. Instead of focusing on the 
Asian cooperation aspect, he returned the focus towards the traditional priority of the U.S.-Japan 
security alliance. Kan's plans for the American troops on Okinawa were also differentiating from 
those of Hatoyama. Hatoyama had debated for a significant decrease of U.S. troops on Okinawa, 
while Kan returned to a previous plan of simply moving the troops to a different location inside 
Okinawa as the financial burden of taking care of a more large-scale operation of troops 
movement was still under debate. 
 Unfortunately Kan's reputation as a maverick became secondary after the 3/11 twin 
disasters that occurred in Japan. Suddenly all eyes were on him to responsibly get Japan out of 
the disasters' aftermath. What ended up being the biggest problem was the lack of transparency 
with dealing with the disasters, something that in the end gave Kan's opposition the necessary 
ammunition to ensure that his reputation as a leader would be tarnished with ease. On the other 
hand, the positive impact of the American troops' aid during the aftermath of the disasters gave 
the intense criticisms on the Okinawa issue a breather, which helped Kan and his successor to 
justify their continually increased closeness with the United States. 
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 The DPJ was also more vocal about its policy towards China during Kan's term in 
opposed to Hatoyama. In the aftermath of the Chinese trawler incident Kan openly talked about 
the problems China was creating with its increased naval activities in the region, and said that it 
was arousing worry and suspicion with its neighbors. Foreign Minister Maehara went further 
with the DPJ's seemingly assertive policy by openly claiming the incident to have been 
deliberate on behalf of the skipper. This was also at the different side for the swing of the 
political pendulum when comparing DPJ's approach to China with his predecessor, whose one 
main concern was connecting Japan's Asian neighbors.  
 The shelling of Yeonpyeong of South Korea by the DPRK happened during PM Kan's 
term. Kan's reaction towards the attack was nothing notable, and a change in the DPRK policy 
towards anything harsher could not be seen. The legacy of the abduction issue since the LDP 
days, however, was still strong and remained as one of the main priorities for Japan's DPRK 
policy during Kan's term. This was evident from his statements from 2011, when he cited 
toughening sanctions if the situation on the abductions would not get clearer. 
 During Kan's term the Russian expansion on the Kurils and the Northern Territories area 
continued and not much change in policy could be seen. Japan was facing an era of having to 
deal with Russia with a highly reactive policy based on their movements on the Kurils issue, as 
no promise of return of the islands existed at the moment. Russia was holding all the cards, 
continuing to increase its defenses and presence in the area. In the end this meant that Japan 
could not do much aside from condemning further movements and hoping for a gesture from 
Russia's part. After all, the policy on economic cooperation between the countries was still going 
strong. 
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 Kan's follower, prime minister Noda has had one of the biggest challenges in the recent 
years when it comes to Sino-Japanese relations. The Senkaku islands problem started flaring up 
in a major way after Japan's announcement of the plans to buy the islands to itself officially in 
2012. The anti-Japanese riots in China and increased Chinese suspicious fishing boat activities 
around the islands have kept the DPJ on its toes. Noda's policy on the issue has been 
uncompromising. Hatoyama's East Asian Community has continued to disappear into the 
background during Noda's term. This is likely to be connected with the current political climate 
with China, as it would probably be impossible to approach it with the territorial row heating up. 
Dealing with the Senkaku issue first has been one of Noda's main priorities. 
 In the case of the DPRK the first actual developments towards a new bilateral negotiation 
happened during PM Noda's term in 2012. Trying to shed more light on the age old abduction 
issue, Japanese and North Korean delegations met first in Beijing in September, and later in Ulan 
Bator in November. The results of the meetings are yet to be released, but knowing the DPRK's 
track record with Japan on these issues the chance of anything concrete coming out of the talks is 
not very high. However, as the DPJ's policy with the DPRK has not achieved any concrete 
results during the terms of the three prime ministers, this may be the first step towards another 
attempt at getting the closed state to open up. 
 The Northern Territories issue with Russia during Noda's term as well has largely 
maintained the status quo. Both sides have been uncompromising with their policies. In the end, 
Russia has no reason at the moment to make amends with the islands issue as it has proven to be 
highly capable of expanding its influence over them. Moreover, due to the spat over the Senkaku 
islands the priority for Japan has shifted greatly towards maintaining the Sino-Japanese situation 
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under control instead of concentrating on the Russo-Japanese policy, which is unlikely to move 
one way or another without a friendly gesture from Russia's side. 
 With the following conclusive remarks on the era under the DPJ, this study has shown 
that although the DPJ was extremely eager to give the general public grand ideas of change in 
comparison to the LDP before and after the elections of 2009, the DPJ was overall  largely guilty 
of over-promoting its ability to differentiate its main policies from the LDP. Rather, the political 
pendulum inside the DPJ's own leadership terms with its three prime ministers has shown greater 
contrast. This has made the party's policy priorities especially between PM Hatoyama and his 
followers to seem to be from a wholly different playbook, which does not bode well for the 
party's future. The oncoming elections of December 2012 will be the main indicator on how the 
political pendulum between the LDP and the DPJ moves next, and if there will be more abrupt 
future swings inside the DPJ leadership's policy as well. 
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